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Turnover Liquidity and the Transmission  
of Monetary Policy†
By Ricardo Lagos and Shengxing Zhang*
We provide empirical evidence of a novel  liquidity-based transmis-
sion mechanism through which monetary policy influences asset 
markets, develop a model of this mechanism, and assess the ability of 
the quantitative theory to match the evidence. (JEL E44, E52, G12, 
G14, G35)
In most modern economies, central banks implement monetary policy indirectly, 
by intervening in certain financial markets (e.g., in the United States, the federal 
funds market and the market for treasury securities). The underlying idea is that 
the effects of those interventions on asset prices are transmitted to the rest of the 
economy to help achieve the ultimate policy objectives. Thus, the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy to asset prices is important for understanding how 
monetary policy actually operates.
In this paper, we conduct an empirical, theoretical, and quantitative study of the 
effects of monetary policy on financial markets in general and the equity market in 
particular. We make three contributions. First, we provide original empirical  evidence 
of a novel channel through which monetary policy influences financial markets: tight 
money increases the opportunity cost of holding the nominal assets used routinely 
to settle financial transactions (e.g., bank reserves, money balances), making these 
payment instruments scarcer. In turn, this scarcity reduces the resalability of finan-
cial assets, and this increased illiquidity leads to a reduction in price. We label this 
mechanism the  turnover-liquidity (transmission) mechanism (of monetary policy). 
Second, to gain a deeper understanding of this mechanism, we develop a theory of 
trade in financial  over-the-counter (OTC) markets (that nests the competitive bench-
mark as a special case) in which money is used as a medium of exchange in financial 
transactions. The model shows how the details of the  market   microstructure and 
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the quantity of money shape the performance of financial markets (e.g., as gauged 
by standard measures of market liquidity), contribute to the determination of asset 
prices (e.g., through the resale option value of assets), and, consistent with the evi-
dence we document, offer a  liquidity-based explanation for the negative correlation 
between real stock returns and unexpected increases in the nominal interest rate that 
is used to implement monetary policy. Third, we bring the theory to the data. We 
calibrate a generalized version of the basic model and use it to conduct quantitative 
theoretical exercises designed to assess the ability of the theory to match the empir-
ical effects of monetary policy on asset prices, both on policy announcement days 
and at longer horizons.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the basic model. 
It considers a setting in which a financial asset that yields a dividend flow of con-
sumption goods (e.g., an equity or a real bond) is demanded by investors who have 
 time-varying heterogeneous valuations for the dividend. To achieve the gains from 
trade that arise from their heterogeneous valuations, investors participate in a bilat-
eral market with random search that is intermediated by specialized dealers who 
have access to a competitive interdealer market. In the  dealer-intermediated bilateral 
market, which has many of the stylized features of a typical OTC  market structure 
but also nests the perfectly competitive market structure as a special case, investors 
and dealers seek to trade the financial asset using money as a means of payment. 
Periodically, dealers and investors are also able to rebalance their  portfolios in a con-
ventional Walrasian market. Equilibrium is characterized in Section II. Section III 
presents the main implications of the theory. Asset prices and conventional measures 
of financial liquidity (e.g., spreads, trade volume, and dealer  supply of immediacy) 
are determined by the (real) quantity of money and the details of the microstructure 
where the asset trades (e.g., the degree of market power of dealers and the ease 
with which investors find counterparties). Generically, asset prices in the monetary 
 economy exhibit a speculative premium whose size varies systematically with the 
market microstructure and the monetary policy stance. For example, a high antic-
ipated opportunity cost of holding money reduces equilibrium real balances and 
distorts the asset allocation by causing too many assets to remain in the hands of 
investors with relatively low valuations, which depresses real asset prices.
Section IV is empirical. In it we revisit the finding, documented in previous empir-
ical work, that surprise increases in the nominal policy rate cause sizable reductions 
in real stock returns on announcement days of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC). A  1 basis point unexpected increase in the policy rate causes a decrease 
of between  5 and  11 basis points in the stock market return on the day of the policy 
announcement. In addition, this section contains two new empirical findings. First, 
we document that episodes of unexpected policy tightening are also associated with 
large and persistent declines in stock turnover. Second, we find evidence that the 
magnitude of the reduction in return caused by the policy tightening is significantly 
larger for stocks that are normally traded more actively, e.g., stocks with higher turn-
over rates. For example, in response to an unexpected increase in the policy rate, the 
 announcement-day decline in the return of a stock in the ninety-fifth percentile of 
turnover rates is about  2.5 times larger than that of a stock in the fifth percentile. The 
empirical evidence in this section suggests a mechanism whereby monetary policy 
affects asset prices through a reduction in turnover liquidity.
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In Section  V we formulate, calibrate, and simulate a generalized version of 
the basic model and use it to assess the ability of the theory to fit the empirical 
evidence on the effects of monetary shocks on aggregate stock returns as well as 
the new  cross-sectional evidence on the  turnover-liquidity transmission mech-
anism. Section  VI concludes. Online Appendix Section A contains all proofs. 
Online Appendix Sections  B, C , D , and  E contain supplementary material. Online 
Appendix Section B covers technical aspects of the data, estimation, and simulation. 
Online Appendix Section C contains additional theoretical derivations and results. 
Online Appendix Section D verifies the robustness of the empirical and quantitative 
findings. This paper is related to four areas of research:  search-theoretic models of 
money,  search-theoretic models of financial trade in OTC markets, resale option 
theories of asset price bubbles, and an extensive empirical literature that studies the 
effects of monetary policy on asset prices. Online Appendix Section E places our 
contribution in the context of all these literatures.
I. Model
Time is represented by a sequence of periods indexed by  t = 0, 1, … . Each 
period is divided into two subperiods where different activities take place. There is 
a continuum of infinitely lived agents called investors, each identified with a point 
in the set   =  [0, 1] . There is also a continuum of infinitely lived agents called 
 dealers, each identified with a point in the set   =  [0, 1] . All agents  discount  payoffs 
across periods with the discount factor  β ≡ 1/ (1 + r) , where  r > 0 denotes the 
real interest rate. In every period, there is a continuum of active  production units 
with measure  A s ∈  ℝ ++ . Every active unit yields an exogenous dividend  y t ∈  ℝ + 
of a perishable consumption good at the end of the first subperiod of period  t . (Each 
active unit yields the same dividend as every other active unit, so  y t  A s is the 
 aggregate dividend.) At the beginning of every period, every active unit is subject 
to an independent idiosyncratic shock that renders it permanently unproductive 
with probability  1 − δ ∈  [0, 1) . If a production unit remains active, its dividend in 
period  t is  y t =  γ t  y t−1 where  γ t is a nonnegative random variable with cumulative 
distribution function  Γ , i.e.,  Pr ( γ t ≤ γ) = Γ (γ) , and mean  γ – ∈  (0,  (βδ) −1 ) . The 
time  t dividend becomes known to all agents at the beginning of period  t , and at that 
time each failed production unit is replaced by a new unit that yields dividend  y t 
in the initial period and follows the same stochastic process as other active units 
thereafter (the dividend of the initial set of production units,  y 0 ∈  ℝ ++ , is given 
at  t = 0 ). In the second subperiod of every period, every agent has access to a linear 
production technology that transforms effort into a perishable consumption good.
For each active production unit, there is a durable and perfectly divisible equity 
share that represents the bearer’s ownership of the production unit and confers him 
the right to collect dividends. At the beginning of every period  t ≥ 1 , each investor 
receives an endowment of  (1 − δ)  A s equity shares corresponding to the new pro-
duction units. (When a production unit fails, its equity share disappears.) There is 
a second financial instrument, money, that is intrinsically useless (it is not an argu-
ment of any utility or production function, and unlike equity, ownership of money 
does not constitute a right to collect any resources). The stock of money at time  t 
is denoted  A t m . The initial stock of money,  A 0 m ∈  ℝ ++ , is given and  A t+1 m = μ  A t m , 
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with  μ ∈  ℝ ++ . A monetary authority injects or withdraws money via  lump-sum 
transfers or taxes to investors in the second subperiod of every period. At the 
 beginning of period  t = 0 , each investor is endowed with a portfolio of equity 
shares and money. All financial instruments are perfectly recognizable, cannot be 
forged, and can be traded in every subperiod.
In the second subperiod of every period, all agents can trade the consumption 
good produced in that subperiod, equity shares, and money in a spot Walrasian mar-
ket. In the first subperiod of every period, trading is organized as follows. Investors 
can trade equity shares and money in a random bilateral OTC market with deal-
ers, while dealers can also trade equity shares and money with other dealers in a 
spot Walrasian dealer market. We use  α ∈  [0, 1] to denote the probability that an 
individual investor is able to make contact with a dealer in the OTC market. (The 
probability that a dealer contacts an investor is also  α .) Once a dealer and an inves-
tor have contacted each other, the pair negotiates the quantity of equity shares and 
money that the dealer will trade in the dealer market on behalf of the investor and 
a fee for the dealer’s intermediation services. We assume the terms of the trade 
between an investor and a dealer in the OTC market are determined by Nash bar-
gaining where  θ ∈  [0, 1] is the investor’s bargaining power. The timing is that the 
round of OTC trade takes place in the first subperiod and ends before production 
units yield dividends. Hence, equity is traded cum dividend in the OTC market (and 
in the dealer market) of the first subperiod and ex dividend in the Walrasian market 
of the second subperiod.1 Asset purchases in the OTC market cannot be financed by 
borrowing (e.g., due to anonymity and lack of commitment and enforcement). This 
assumption and the structure of preferences described below create the need for a 
medium of exchange in the OTC market.
An individual dealer’s preferences are represented by
  E 0 d  ∑ 
t=0
∞
 β t ( c dt −  h dt ) , 
where  c dt is his consumption of the homogeneous good that is produced, traded, 
and consumed in the second subperiod of period  t , and  h dt is the utility cost from 
exerting  h dt units of effort to produce this good. The expectation operator  E 0 d is with 
respect to the probability measure induced by the dividend process and the random 
trading process in the OTC market. Dealers get no utility from the dividend good.2 
An individual investor’s preferences are represented by
  E  0  ∑ 
t=0
∞
  β t ( ε it  y it +  c it −  h it ) , 
where  y it is the quantity of the dividend good that investor  i consumes at the end of 
the first subperiod of period  t ,  c it is his consumption of the homogeneous good that 
is produced, traded, and consumed in the second subperiod of period  t , and  h it is 
1 As in previous search models of OTC  markets (e.g., see Duffie, Gârleanu, and  Pedersen 2005 and Lagos 
and Rocheteau 2009), an investor must own the equity share in order to consume the dividend.
2 This assumption implies that dealers have no direct consumption motive for holding the equity share. It is 
easy to relax, but we adopt it because it is the standard benchmark in the  search-based OTC literature, e.g., see 
Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005); Lagos and Rocheteau (2009); Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011); and 
Weill (2007).
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the utility cost from exerting  h it units of effort to produce this good. The variable  ε it 
denotes the realization of a valuation shock that is distributed independently over 
time and across agents, with a differentiable cumulative distribution function  G on 
the support  [ ε L ,  ε H ] ⊆  [0, ∞] , and  ε – = ∫ ε dG (ε) . Investor  i learns his realization  ε it 
at the beginning of period  t , before the OTC trading round. The expectation oper-
ator  E 0 is with respect to the probability measure induced by the dividend process, 
the investor’s valuation shock, and the random trading process in the OTC market.3
Consider a social planner who wishes to maximize the sum of all agents’ expected 
discounted utilities subject to the same meeting frictions that agents face in the decen-
tralized formulation. Specifically, in the first subperiod of every period, the planner 
can only reallocate assets among all dealers and the measure  α of investors who 
contact dealers at random. In online Appendix Section C (Proposition 11), we prove 
the allocation that solves the planner’s problem is  characterized by the  following two 
properties: (i) only dealers carry equity between periods, and (ii) dealers do not carry 
assets after the OTC round of trade, and among those investors who have a trading 
opportunity with a dealer in the OTC market, only those with the highest valuation 
hold equity shares at the end of the first  subperiod. The planner’s problem is useful to 
highlight the two (re)allocation motives that will drive equilibrium outcomes in the 
following section.4 First, the planner implements an efficient allocation of assets in 
the OTC trading round: since an investor’s utility from the dividend good is linear, 
and dealers get no utility from the dividend good, the efficient allocation requires that 
all the assets held by dealers at the beginning of the period are reallocated to the set of 
investors with the highest valuation for the dividend. Second, by allocating all assets 
to dealers at the end of every period, the planner ensures that all assets can be reallo-
cated to the set of highest valuation investors in the following OTC trading round with 
probability 1 (notice that if instead a set of investors were to enter the OTC round 
holding the asset, most of these investors would draw valuation shocks strictly lower 
than  ε H , and the planner would only be able to reallocate a fraction  α < 1 of those 
assets to the highest valuation investors who contacted dealers).
II. Equilibrium
Consider the determination of the terms of trade in a bilateral meeting in the 
OTC round of period  t between a dealer with portfolio  a dt and an investor with 
 portfolio  a it and valuation  ε . Let  a –t =  ( a –t m ,  a –t s) denote the investor’s  post-trade 
 portfolio and let  φ t denote the fee the dealer charges for his intermediation 
 services. The fee is expressed in terms of the  second-subperiod consumption good 
and paid by the  investor in the second subperiod.5 We assume  ( a 
–
t ,  φ t ) is determined 
3 The valuation shock stands in for the various idiosyncratic reasons why individual investors may wish to hold 
different quantities of a certain asset at different points in time, such as differences in their liquidity needs, financing 
or  financial-distress costs, or hedging needs (e.g., correlation of asset returns with endowments). Several papers that 
build on the work of Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) have formalized the “hedging needs” interpretation. 
Examples include Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2007); Gârleanu (2009); and Vayanos and Weill (2008).
4 Below we show that, under the Friedman rule, the decentralized monetary equilibrium implements the plan-
ner’s allocation (see Corollary 1).
5 In the working paper version of this model (Lagos and Zhang 2015), we instead assume that the investor must 
pay the intermediation fee on the spot, i.e., with money or equity. The alternative formulation we use here makes 
the analysis and the exposition much simpler while the main economic mechanisms are essentially unchanged.
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by the Nash  bargaining solution where the investor has bargaining power  θ ∈  [0, 1] . 
Let  W ˆ t D ( a dt ,  φ t ) denote the maximum expected discounted payoff of a dealer with 
 portfolio  a dt and earned fee  φ t when he reallocates his portfolio in the dealer mar-
ket of period  t . Let  W t I ( a it ,  φ t ) denote the maximum expected discounted payoff at 
the beginning of the second subperiod of period  t (after the production units have 
borne dividends) of an investor who is holding portfolio  a it and has to pay a fee  φ t . 
For each  t , define a pair of functions  a –t k :  ℝ + 2 ×  [ ε L ,  ε H ] →  ℝ + for  k = m, s and a 
function  φ t :  ℝ + 2 ×  [ ε L ,  ε H ] → ℝ , and let  a –t ( a it , ε) =  ( a –t m ( a it , ε) ,  a –t s( a it , ε) ) for each 
( a it , ε) ∈  ℝ + 2 ×  [ ε L ,  ε H ] . We use  [ a –t  ( a it , ε) ,  φ t  ( a it , ε) ] to represent the  bargaining 
 outcome for a bilateral meeting at time  t between an investor with portfolio  a it and 
valuation  ε , and a dealer with portfolio  a dt . That is,  [ a –t ( a it , ε) ,  φ t  ( a it , ε) ] solves
(1)  max 
 ( a –t ,  φ t ) ∈ ℝ + 2 ×ℝ
 { [ε y t  a –t s +  W t I ( a –t ,  φ t ) − ε y t  a it s −  W t I ( a it , 0) ] θ 
 ×  [ W ˆ t D ( a dt ,  φ t ) −  W ˆ t D ( a dt , 0) ] 1−θ } ,
 subject to 
  a –t m +  p t  a –t s ≤  a it m +  p t  a it s,
  W ˆ t D ( a dt , 0) ≤  W ˆ t D ( a dt ,  φ t ) ,
  ε y t  a it s +  W t I ( a it , 0) ≤ ε y t  a –t s +  W t I ( a –t ,  φ t ) , 
where  p t is the dollar price of an equity share in the dealer market of period  t .
Let  W t D ( a t ,  φ t ) denote the maximum expected discounted payoff of a dealer who 
has earned fee  φ t in the OTC round of period  t and, at the beginning of the second 
subperiod of period  t , is holding portfolio  a t . Then the dealer’s value of trading in 
the dealer market is
(2)  W ˆ t D ( a t ,  φ t ) =  max 
 a ˆ t ∈ ℝ + 2 
 W t D ( a ˆ t ,  φ t ) ,
 subject to 
  a ˆ t m +  p t  a ˆ t s ≤  a t m +  p t  a t s , 
where  a ˆ t ≡  ( a ˆ t m ,  a ˆ t s) . For each  t , define a pair of functions,  a ˆ t k :  ℝ + 2 →  ℝ + 
for  k = m, s , and let  a ˆ t  ( a t ) =  ( a ˆ t m  ( a t ) ,  a ˆ t s( a t ) ) denote the solution to (2).
Let  V t D ( a t ) denote the maximum expected discounted payoff of a dealer who 
enters the OTC round of period  t with portfolio  a t ≡  ( a t m ,  a t s ) . Let  ϕ t ≡  ( ϕ t m ,  ϕ t s) , 
where  ϕ t m is the real price of money and  ϕ t s the real ex dividend price of equity in 
the second subperiod of period  t (both expressed in terms of the second subperiod 
consumption good). Then,
(3)  W t D ( a t ,  φ t ) =  max 
 ( c t ,  h  t ,  a ̃ t+1 ) ∈ ℝ + 4 
 [ c t −  h t + β E tV t+1 D ( a t+1 ) ] ,
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 subject to 
  c t +  ϕ t  a ̃ t+1 ≤  h t +  φ t +  ϕ t  a t , 
where  a ̃ t+1 ≡  ( a ̃ t+1 m ,  a ̃ t+1 s ) ,  a t+1 =  ( a ̃ t+1 m , δ a ̃ t+1 s ) ,  E t is the conditional expectation 
over the  next-period realization of the dividend, and  ϕ t  a t denotes the dot product 
of  ϕ t and  a t . Similarly, let  V t I ( a t , ε) denote the maximum expected discounted payoff 
of an investor with valuation  ε and portfolio  a t ≡  ( a t m ,  a t s ) at the beginning of the 
OTC round of period  t . Then,
(4)  W t I ( a t ,  φ t ) =  max 
 ( c t , h  t , a ̃ t+1 ) ∈ ℝ + 4 
 [ c t −  h  t + β E t ∫ V t+1 I ( a t+1 , ε′ ) dG (ε′) ] ,
 subject to 
  c t +  ϕ t  a ̃ t+1 ≤  h  t −  φ t +  ϕ t  a t +  T t , 
where  a t+1 =  ( a ̃ t+1 m , δ a ̃ t+1 s +  (1 − δ) A s ) and  T t ∈ ℝ is the real value of the time  t 
 lump-sum monetary transfer.6
The value function of an investor who enters the OTC round of period  t with 
portfolio  a t and valuation  ε is
  V t I ( a t , ε) = α {ε y t  a –t s ( a t , ε) +  W t I [ a –t ( a t , ε) ,  φ t ( a t , ε) ] } 
  +  (1 − α) [ε y t  a t s +  W t I ( a t , 0) ] . 
The value function of a dealer who enters the OTC round of period  t with portfolio  a t 
is
  V t D ( a t ) = α∫ W ˆ t D [ a t ,  φ t ( a it , ε) ] d H It ( a it , ε) +  (1 − α) W ˆ t D ( a t  , 0) , 
where  H It is the cumulative distribution function over the portfolios and valuations 
of the investors the dealer may contact in the OTC market of period  t .
Let  j ∈  {D, I } denote the agent type, i.e.,  D   for dealers and  I   for inves-
tors. Then for  j ∈  {D, I } , let  A jt m and  A jt s denote the quantities of money 
and equity shares,   respectively, held by all agents of type  j at the begin-
ning of the OTC round of period  t (after production units have depreci-
ated and been replaced). That is,  A jt m = ∫ a t m d F jt ( a t ) and  A jt s = ∫ a t s d F jt ( a t ) , 
where  F jt is the cumulative distribution function over portfolios  a t =  ( a t m ,  a t s ) 
held by agents of type  j at the beginning of the OTC round of period  t . 
Let  A ̃ jt+1 m and  A ̃ jt+1 s denote the total quantities of money and shares held by all agents 
of type  j at the end of period  t , i.e.,  A ̃ Dt+1 k =  ∫  
 
  a ̃ jt+1 k dj and  A ̃ It+1 k =  ∫  
 
 a ̃ it+1 k di 
for  k ∈  {s, m} , with  A Dt+1 m =  A ̃ Dt+1 m ,  A Dt+1 s = δ A ̃ Dt+1 s ,  A It+1 m =  A ̃ It+1 m , and 
6 In terms of notation, our convention is to use overbars, e.g.,  a –, for an investor’s  post-trade portfolio at the end 
of the first subperiod; overtildes, e.g.,  a ̃ , for the portfolio an investor chooses at the end of the second subperiod; and 
hats, e.g.,  a ˆ, for the  post-trade portfolio a dealer chooses at the end of the first subperiod (after the round of trade 
with investors has taken place).
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 A It+1 s = δ A ̃ It+1 s +  (1 − δ) A s . Let  A 
–
Dt m and  A 
–
Dt s denote the quantities of money and 
shares held after the OTC round of trade of period  t by all the dealers, and let  A 
–
It m
and  A 
–
It s denote the quantities of money and shares held after the OTC round of 
trade of period  t by all the investors who are able to trade in the first subperiod. 
For asset  k ∈  {s, m} ,  A – Dt k = ∫ a ˆ t k  ( a t ) d F Dt ( a t ) and  A 
–
It k = α∫ a –t k ( a t , ε) d H It  ( a t , ε) . We 
are now ready to define an equilibrium.
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium is a sequence of prices,  {1 / p t ,  ϕ t m ,  ϕ t s} t=0 ∞ , 
bilateral terms of trade in the OTC market,  { a 
–
t ,  φ t } t=0 ∞ , dealer 
 portfolios,  { ⟨  a ˆdt ,  a ̃dt+1 ,  a dt+1 ⟩ d∈ } t=0 
∞
 , and investor portfolios,  { ⟨  a ̃ it+1 ,  a it+1 ⟩ i∈  } t=0 
∞
 , 
such that for all  t : (i ) the bilateral terms of trade  { a –t ,  φ t } t=0 ∞ solve (1), (ii ) taking 
prices and the bargaining protocol as given, the portfolios  ⟨  a ˆdt ,  a ̃dt+1 ,  a dt+1 ⟩ solve 
the individual dealer’s problems (2) and (3), and the portfolios  ⟨  a ̃ it+1 ,  a it+1 ⟩ solve 
the individual investor’s problem (4), and (iii) prices,  {1/ p t ,  ϕ t m ,  ϕ t s} t=0 ∞ , are such 
that all Walrasian markets clear, i.e.,  A ̃ Dt+1 s +  A ̃ It+1 s =  A s (the  end-of-period  t 
Walrasian market for equity clears),  A ̃ Dt+1 m +  A ̃ It+1 m =  A t+1 m (the  end-of-period  t 
Walrasian market for money clears), and  A – Dt k +  A 
–
It k =  A Dt k + α A It k for  k = s, m 
(the period  t OTC dealer markets for equity and money clear). An equilibrium is 
“ monetary” if  ϕ t m > 0 for all  t and “nonmonetary” otherwise.
The following result characterizes the equilibrium  post-trade portfolios of dealers 
and investors in the OTC market, taking  beginning-of-period portfolios as given.
LEMMA 1: Define  ε t ⁎ ≡  
 p t  ϕ t m −  ϕ t s _ y t  and









if   ε t ⁎ < ε
  ∈  [0, 1] if   ε t ⁎ = ε
= 0 if ε <  ε t ⁎ .
 
Consider a bilateral meeting in the OTC round of period  t between a dealer and 
an investor with portfolio  a t and valuation  ε . The investor’s  post-trade portfolio, 
 [ a –t m ( a t , ε) ,  a –t s( a t , ε) ] , is given by
  a –t m ( a t , ε) =  [1 − χ ( ε t ⁎ , ε) ] ( a t m +  p t  a t s ) ,
  a –t s( a t , ε) = χ ( ε t ⁎ , ε) (1 / p t ) ( a t m +  p t  a t s ) , 
and the intermediation fee charged by the dealer is
  φ t ( a t , ε) =  (1 − θ) (ε −  ε t ⁎ ) [χ ( ε t ⁎ , ε)  1 _  p t  a t 
m −  [1 − χ ( ε t ⁎ , ε) ] a t s ]  y t . 
A dealer who enters the OTC market with portfolio  a dt exits the OTC market with 
portfolio  [ a ˆ t m ( a dt ) ,  a ˆ t s( a dt ) ] =  [ a –t m ( a dt , 0) ,  a –t s( a dt , 0) ] .
Lemma 1 offers a full characterization of the  post-trade portfolios of investors 
and dealers in the OTC market. First, the bargaining outcome depends on whether 
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the investor’s valuation,  ε , is above or below a cutoff,  ε t ⁎ . If  ε t ⁎ < ε , the investor 
uses all his cash to buy equity. If  ε <  ε t ⁎ , he sells all his equity holding for cash. 
The intermediation fee earned by the dealer is equal to a share  1 − θ of the investor’s 
gain from trade. The dealer’s  post-trade portfolio is the same as that of an investor 
with  ε = 0 .
We focus the analysis on recursive equilibria, that is, equilibria in which aggre-
gate equity holdings are constant over time, i.e.,  A Dt s =  A D s and  A It s =  A I s for all  t , 
and real asset prices are  time-invariant linear functions of the aggregate dividend, 
i.e.,  ϕ t s =  ϕ s  y t ,   p t  ϕ t m ≡  ϕ 
–
t s =  ϕ 
– s  y t ,  ϕ t m  A It m = Z y t , and  ϕ t m  A Dt m =  Z D  y t , where 
 Z,  Z D ∈  ℝ + Hence, in a recursive equilibrium,  ε t ⁎ =  ϕ 
– s −  ϕ s ≡  ε ⁎ , 
 ϕ t+1 s / ϕ t s =  ϕ 
–
t+1 s / ϕ 
–
t s =  γ t+1 ,  ϕ t m / ϕ t+1 m = μ / γ t+1 , and  p t+1 / p t = μ . Throughout 
the analysis, we let  β – ≡ β γ – and maintain the assumption  μ >  β – (but we consider 
the limiting case  μ →  β –).
For the analysis that follows, it is convenient to define
(5)  μ ˆ ≡  β –[1 +  
 (1 − αθ) (1 −  β –δ) ( ε ˆ −  ε –) 
   __________________  ε ˆ ] ,
  μ – ≡  β –
[
1 +  
αθ (1 −  β –δ) ( ε – −  ε L )   ______________
 β –δ ε – +  (1 −  β 




where  ε ˆ ∈  [ ε –,  ε H ] is the unique solution to
(6)  ε – −  ε ˆ + αθ ∫  ε L  
 ε ˆ( ε ˆ − ε) dG (ε) = 0. 
Lemma 4 (in online Appendix A) establishes that  μ ˆ <  μ – . The following proposi-
tion  characterizes the equilibrium set.
PROPOSITION 1: (i ) A nonmonetary equilibrium exists for any parametrization. 
(ii ) There is no recursive monetary equilibrium if  μ ≥  μ – . (iii) In the nonmonetary 
equilibrium,  A I s =  A s −  A D s =  A s (only investors hold equity), there is no trade in 
the OTC market, and the equity price in the second subperiod is
(7)  ϕ t s =  ϕ s  y t , with   ϕ s =  
 β –δ _____ 
1 −  β –δ
 ε –. 
(iv) If  μ ∈  ( β 
–
,  μ –) , then there is one recursive monetary equilibrium; asset 
holdings of dealers and investors at the beginning of the OTC round of period  t 
are  A Dt m =  A t m −  A It m = 0 and







= δ  A s 
 
if  β – < μ <  μ ˆ 
   ∈  [0, δ A s  ] if μ =  μ ˆ 
= 0
 
if  μ ˆ < μ <  μ – ,
 
and asset prices are







  β 
–δ ____ 
1 −  β –δ
 ε ⁎ 
 
if  β – < μ ≤  μ ˆ 
     
  β 
–δ ____ 
1 −  β –δ[ ε 
– + αθ ∫  ε L  
 ε ⁎  ( ε ⁎ − ε) dG (ε) ] 
 
if  μ ˆ < μ <  μ – ,
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(9)  ϕ – t s =  ϕ 
– s y t , with  ϕ 
– s =  ε ⁎ +  ϕ s ,
(10)  ϕ t m = Z 
 y t  _  A t m 
,
(11)  p t =  
 ϕ – s 
 __
Z  A t 
m , 
where
(12)  Z =  
αG ( ε ⁎ )  A I s +  A D s   ____________
α [1 − G ( ε ⁎ ) ] 
  ( ε ⁎ +  ϕ s ) ,
and for any  μ ∈  ( β 
–
,  μ –) ,  ε ⁎ ∈  ( ε L ,  ε H ) is the unique solution to
(13)  
 (1 −  β 
–δ) ∫  ε ⁎  
 ε H 
 (ε −  ε ⁎ ) dG (ε) 
    _________________________________ 
 ε ⁎ +  β –δ [ ε 
– −  ε ⁎ + αθ ∫  ε L  
 ε ⁎  ( ε ⁎ − ε) dG (ε) ] 1  { μ ˆ < μ}  




 = 0. 
(v) (a) As  μ →  μ – ,  ε ⁎ →  ε L and  ϕ t s →  ( β 
–δ/ (1 −  β –δ) ) ε –  y t . (b) As  μ →  β 
–
, 
 ε ⁎ →  ε H and  ϕ t s →  ( β 
–δ/ (1 −  β –δ) ) ε H  y t .
In the nonmonetary equilibrium, dealers are inactive and equity shares are held 
only by investors. With no valued money, investors and dealers cannot exploit the 
gains from trade that arise from the heterogeneity in investor valuations in the first 
subperiod, and the real asset price is  ϕ s =  ( β 
–δ/ (1 −  β –δ) ) ε –y , i.e., equal to the 
expected discounted value of the dividend stream since the equity share is not traded. 
(Shares can be traded in the Walrasian market of the second subperiod, but gains 
from trade at that stage are nil.) The recursive monetary equilibrium exists only if 
the inflation rate is not too high, i.e., if  μ <  μ – . In the monetary equilibrium, the 
marginal valuation,  ε ⁎ , which according to Lemma 1 partitions the set of investors 
into those who buy and those who sell the asset when they meet a dealer in the OTC 
market, is characterized by (13) in part (iv) of Proposition 1. Unlike what happens in 
the nonmonetary equilibrium, the OTC market is active in the monetary equilibrium, 
and it is easy to show that the marginal valuation,  ε ⁎ , is strictly decreasing in the rate 
of inflation, i.e.,  ∂ ε ⁎ /∂ μ < 0 (see Corollary 3 in the online Appendix). Intuitively, 
the real value of money falls as  μ increases, so the marginal investor valuation,  ε ⁎ , 
decreases, reflecting the fact that under the higher inflation rate, the investor who 
was marginal under the lower inflation rate is no longer indifferent between carrying 
cash and equity out of the OTC market: he prefers equity.
According to Proposition 1,  0 ≤  ε L <  ε t ⁎ in the monetary equilibrium, so 
Lemma 1 implies that dealers hold no equity shares at the end of the OTC round: all 
equity is held by investors, in particular, by those investors who carried equity into 
the period but were unable to contact a dealer, and by those investors who purchased 
equity shares in bilateral trades with dealers. After the round of OTC trade, all the 
money supply is held by the investors who carried cash into the period but were 
unable to contact a dealer, by the investors who sold equity shares through dealers, 
and by those dealers who carried equity into the OTC market.
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A feature of the monetary equilibrium is that dealers never hold money  overnight: 
at the beginning of every period  t , the money supply is all in the hands of  investors, 
i.e.,  A Dt m = 0 and  A It m =  A t m . The reason is that access to the dealer market allows 
dealers to intermediate assets without cash. Whether it is investors or dealers who 
hold the equity shares overnight depends on the inflation rate: if it is low, i.e., 
if  μ ∈  ( β 
–
,  μ ˆ ) , then only dealers hold equity overnight, that is,  A ̃ Dt+1 s =  A s 
and  A ̃ It+1 s = 0 for all  t . Conversely, if the inflation rate is high, i.e., if  μ ∈  ( μ ˆ ,  μ –) , 
then at the end of every period  t , all equity shares are in the hands of investors, 
i.e.,  A ̃ Dt+1 s = 0 and  A ̃ It+1 s =  A s , so strictly speaking, in this case dealers only 
 provide  brokerage  services in the OTC market. The intuition for this result is as 
follows.7 For  dealers, the return from holding equity overnight is given by the resale 
price in the OTC  market. If inflation is low,  ε t ⁎ is high (the asset is priced by rela-
tively high valuation investors), and this means the resale price in the OTC market is 
high. Since dealers are sure to trade in the OTC market every period while investors 
only trade with effective probability  αθ , the former are in a better position to reap the 
capital gains and end up holding all equity shares overnight. Conversely, if inflation 
is high then  ε t ⁎ is low, so the capital gain to a dealer from carrying the asset to sell in 
the OTC market is small. The benefit to investors from holding equity includes not 
only the resale value in the OTC market (which is small at high inflation) but also 
their own expected valuation of the dividend good, so for high inflation, the return 
that investors obtain from holding equity overnight is higher than it is for dealers. 
For example, as  μ →  μ – we have  ε t ⁎ →  ε L , so the dealer’s expected return from 
holding equity overnight is  ( ε L +  ϕ s ) γ –/ ϕ s , while the investor’s is  ( ε – +  ϕ s ) γ –/ ϕ s .
Given the marginal valuation,  ε ⁎ , part (iv) of Proposition 1 gives all asset prices 
in closed form. The real ex dividend price of equity (in terms of the second subpe-
riod consumption good),  ϕ t s, is given by (8). The cum-dividend dollar price of equity 
in the OTC market,  p t , is given by (11). The real price of money (in terms of the 
second subperiod consumption good),  ϕ t m , is given by (10). The real cum-dividend 
price of equity (in terms of the second subperiod consumption good) in the OTC 
market,  p t  ϕ t m =  ϕ 
– s
  y t , is given by (9).
Finally, part (va) states that as the rate of money creation increases toward  μ – ,  ε ⁎ 
approaches the lower bound of the distribution of valuations,  ε L , so no  investor 
wishes to sell equity in the OTC market, and as a result the allocations and prices 
of the monetary equilibrium approach those of the nonmonetary equilibrium. 
Part (vb) states that as  μ decreases toward  β –,  ε ⁎ increases toward the upper bound 
of the distribution of valuations,  ε H , so only investors with the highest valuation 
 purchase equity in the OTC market (all other investors wish to sell it). Moreover, 
since  β – <  μ ˆ , as  μ →  β – only dealers hold equity overnight. Thus, we have the 
following result.
COROLLARY 1: The allocation implemented by the recursive monetary 
 equilibrium converges to the efficient allocation as  μ →  β –.
7 See Lagos and Zhang (2015) for a more detailed discussion.
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Let  q t, k B denote the nominal price in the second subperiod of period  t of 
an  N -period  risk-free pure discount nominal bond that matures in period  t + k , 
for  k = 0, 1, 2, …, N (so  k is the number of periods until the bond matures). Imagine 
the bond cannot be used as means of payment in the first subperiod.8 Then in 
a recursive monetary equilibrium,  q t,k B =  ( β 
–/ μ) k , and  i = μ / β 
– − 1 is the 
time  t nominal yield to maturity of the bond with  k periods until maturity. Thus, 
the  optimal monetary policy described in Corollary 1 and part (vb) of Proposition 
1 in which  μ =  β – can be interpreted as a policy that implements the Friedman 
rule, i.e.,  i = 0 for all contingencies at all dates. Since the (gross) inflation rate is 
 ϕ t m / ϕ t+1 m = μ  ( y t / y t+1 ) ≡ 1 +  π t+1 ,  1 + i = μ / β 
–
is equivalent to
(14)  1 + i =  (1 + r) (1 + π) , 
with  1 + π ≡  [ E t  
1 _ 1 +  π t+1 ] 
−1
 = μ / γ –.
III. Implications
In this section, we discuss the main implications of the theory. Specifically, we 
show how asset prices and trade volume are determined by monetary policy and the 
details of the microstructure where the asset trades (e.g., the degree of market power 
of dealers and the ease with which investors find counterparties).9
A. Asset Prices
In this subsection, we study the  asset-pricing implications of the theory. We 
focus on how the asset price depends on monetary policy and on the degree of 
OTC  frictions as captured by the parameters that regulate trading frequency and the 
relative bargaining strengths of traders.10
The real price of equity in a monetary equilibrium is in part determined by the option 
available to  low-valuation investors to resell the equity to  high-valuation investors. 
If the growth rate of the money supply (and therefore the inflation rate) increases, 
equilibrium real money balances decline and the marginal  investor  valuation,  ε ⁎ , 
decreases, reflecting the fact that under the higher inflation rate, the investor valua-
tion that was marginal under the lower inflation rate is no  longer  indifferent between 
carrying cash and equity out of the OTC market: he prefers equity. Since the mar-
ginal investor who prices equity in the OTC market has a lower valuation, the value 
of the resale option is smaller, i.e., the turnover liquidity of the asset is lower, which 
8 Notice that even though the bond cannot be traded for equity in the OTC round of trade, it can be exchanged 
(or redeemed) for money at the end of the period at no cost. Hence, how “illiquid” we deem this bond depends on 
the length of the model period. If, as in the quantitative analysis of Section V, the model period corresponds to one 
trading day, then the bond is in fact very liquid, or “very close to cash” according to the usual  real-world standards.
9 We focus on trade volume as a measure of financial liquidity because it will be the relevant variable in our 
empirical analysis. For completeness, in online Appendix Section A.A5 we show how conventional measures of 
financial liquidity other than trade volume (e.g., spreads, and dealer supply of immediacy) are determined by mon-
etary policy and the details of the microstructure. In online Appendix Section A.A7 we also show that generically, 
asset prices in the monetary economy exhibit a speculative premium whose size varies systematically with mone-
tary policy and the market microstructure.
10 In Proposition  9 in the online Appendix we also establish the effect of a  mean-preserving spread in the 
 distribution of valuations on the equity price.
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in turn makes the real equity price (both the ex   dividend price,  ϕ s , and the cum- 
dividend price,  ϕ – s ) smaller. Naturally, the real value of money,  ϕ t m , is also decreasing 
in the growth rate of the money supply.11 All of this is formalized in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: In the recursive monetary equilibrium:  (i)  ∂ ϕ s / ∂ μ < 0 , 
(ii)  ∂ ϕ – s / ∂ μ < 0 , (iii)  ∂ Z / ∂ μ < 0 , and  ∂ ϕ t m / ∂ μ < 0 .
Proposition 2 is useful for settings where monetary policy operates by changing 
the expected inflation rate, i.e., settings where changes in  i are associated exclu-
sively with changes in  π in (14). The following result examines the behavior of real 
asset prices in settings where changes in  i are associated exclusively with changes 
in the real interest rate,  r .12
PROPOSITION 3: In the recursive monetary equilibrium:  (i)  ∂ ϕ s / ∂ r < 0 , 
(ii)  ∂ Z / ∂ r < 0 and  ∂ ϕ t m / ∂ r < 0 .
In the OTC market,  α is the probability an investor is able to contact a dealer, and  θ 
is the investor’s share of the gain from trade conditional on trading with a dealer. 
Hence, a larger  αθ implies a larger expected gain from trade for  low-valuation inves-
tors when they sell the asset to dealers. In turn, this makes investors more willing 
to hold equity shares in the previous period, since they anticipate larger gains from 
selling the equity in case they were to draw a relatively low valuation in the follow-
ing OTC round. Therefore, real equity prices,  ϕ s and  ϕ – s , are increasing in  α and  θ .13 
If  α increases, money becomes more valuable (both  Z and  ϕ t m increase), provided 
we focus on a regime in which only investors carry equity overnight.14 Proposition 
4 formalizes these ideas.
PROPOSITION 4: In the recursive monetary equilibrium:  (i)  ∂ ϕ s / ∂ (αθ) > 0 , 
(ii)  ∂ ϕ – s / ∂ (αθ) > 0 , (iii)  ∂ Z / ∂ α > 0 and  ∂ ϕ t m / ∂ α > 0 , for  μ ∈  ( μ ˆ ,  μ –) .
B. Trade Volume
Trade volume is commonly used as a measure of market liquidity because 
it is a manifestation of the ability of the market to reallocate assets across inves-
tors. According to Lemma 1, any investor with  ε <  ε t ⁎ who has a trading oppor-
tunity in the OTC  market sells all his equity holding. Hence, in a recursive 
equilibrium, the quantity of assets sold by investors to dealers in the OTC market is 
11 The top row of online Appendix Figure A1 illustrates the typical time paths of the ex dividend equity price,  ϕ t s, 
real balances,  ϕ t m  A t m , and the price level,  ϕ t m , for different values of  μ .
12 The proof of Proposition 3, in online Appendix  Section A.A4, is based on a  continuous-time version of 
our  discrete-time economy. The  continuous-time formulation can be interpreted as an approximation to our base-
line  discrete-time model when the period length is small. Apart from allowing sharper analytical results, the 
 continuous-time formulation is useful since the model period in our quantitative implementation of the theory is 
very short (specifically, a trading day; see Section VB for details).
13 This finding is consistent with the behavior of the illiquidity premia in response to variations in the measures 
of liquidity documented by Ang, Shtauber, and Tetlock (2013).
14 Real balances can actually fall with  α for  μ ∈  ( β 
–
,  μ ˆ ) . The bottom row of online Appendix Figure A1 illus-
trates the time paths of the ex dividend equity price,  ϕ t s, real balances  ϕ t m  A t m , and the price level,  ϕ t m , for two dif-
ferent values of  α .
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 Q s = αG ( ε ⁎ )  A I s . From Lemma 1, the quantity of assets purchased by investors 
from dealers is  Q b = α [1 − G ( ε ⁎ ) ]  A t m / p t . Thus, the total quantity of equity shares 
traded in the OTC market is   =  Q b +  Q s , or equivalently15
(15)   = 2αG ( ε ⁎ )  A I s +  A D s . 
Trade volume,   , depends on the growth rate of the money supply,  μ , (or equiv-
alently, expected inflation), the real interest rate,  r , and dealers’ market power  θ 
indirectly, through the general equilibrium effect on  ε ⁎ . A decrease in  μ or  r , or 
an increase in  θ increases the expected return to holding money relative to equity, 
which makes more investors willing to sell equity for money in the OTC market, 
i.e.,  ε ⁎ increases and so does trade volume, provided  G′ ( ε ⁎ ) > 0 . In other words, 
the increase in turnover liquidity caused by a decrease in  μ or  r , or an increase in  θ 
will manifest itself through an increase in trade volume provided the cumulative 
distribution of investors is strictly increasing over the relevant range. The indirect 
positive effect on   (through  ε ⁎ ) of an increase in the investors’ trade probability  α 
is similar to an increase in  θ , but in addition,  α directly increases trade volume, since 
with a higher  α more investors are able to trade in the OTC market. These results are 
summarized in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5: In the recursive monetary equilibrium, provided  G′ ( ε ⁎ ) > 0 : 
(i)  ∂  / ∂ μ < 0 , (ii)  ∂  / ∂ r < 0 , (iii)  ∂  / ∂ θ > 0 and  ∂  / ∂ α > 0 .
C. Discussion
In this section we explain the economic rationale behind Propositions 2 and 3. 
To streamline the exposition, focus on a recursive monetary equilibrium in which 
investors carry equity overnight. In this case, the Euler equations for money and 
equity are
(16)  ϕ t m =  1 _ 1 + r  E t[ ϕ t+1 
m + αθ ∫ 
 ε ⁎ 
 
 ε H 
  
 (ε −  ε ⁎ )  y t+1   _ p t+1  dG (ε) ] ,
(17)  ϕ t s =  1 _ 1 + r δ E  t [ ε 
–  y t+1 +  ϕ t+1 s + αθ ∫  ε L  
 ε ⁎  ( ε ⁎ − ε)  y t+1 dG (ε) ] . 
(See Corollary 2 in the online Appendix for details.) On the left side of (16),  ϕ t m 
represents the cost (in terms of the  second-subperiod consumption good) of pur-
chasing an additional dollar in the competitive market of the second subperiod of 
period  t . On the right side of (16) is the discounted expected value of the additional 
 dollar in period  t + 1 . This marginal value equals the expected value from hold-
ing the dollar for a whole period (until the competitive trading round at the end of 
period  t + 1 ), i.e.,  ϕ t+1 m , plus the expected value of the option to exchange the dollar 
15 To obtain (15) we used the clearing condition for the dealer market,  Q b =  Q s +  A Dt s . Also, note that   is trade 
volume in the OTC market, but since every equity share traded in the first subperiod gets retraded in the second 
subperiod, total trade volume in the whole time period equals  2 .
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for equity shares in the OTC round at the beginning of period  t + 1 . This option is 
 executed provided the investor gets access to the dealer market (with  probability  α ), 
gets a share  θ of the gain from trade with the dealer, and gets a random valua-
tion higher than  ε ⁎ , so the expected gain from exchanging the dollar for equity is 
 αθ ∫  ε ⁎  
 ε H   (ε −  ε ⁎ ) y t+1 / p t+1 dG (ε) . Next, consider (17). On the left side,  ϕ t s represents 
the cost (in terms of the  second-subperiod consumption good) of purchasing an addi-
tional equity share in the competitive market of the second subperiod of period  t . On 
the right side is the discounted (net of depreciation) expected value of the additional 
equity share in period  t + 1 . This marginal value equals the expected  cum-dividend 
value from holding the equity share for a whole period (until the competitive  trading 
round at the end of period  t + 1 ), i.e.,  ε –  y t+1 +  ϕ t+1 s , plus the expected value of the 
option to resell the asset in the OTC round at the beginning of period  t + 1 . This 
resale option is executed provided the investor gets access to the dealer  market 
(with probability  α ), gets a share  θ of the gain from trade with the dealer, and gets 
a random valuation lower than  ε ⁎ , so the expected value of the resale option is 
 αθ ∫  ε L  
 ε ⁎  ( ε ⁎ − ε)  y t+1 dG (ε) . This additional term that makes the equilibrium real value 
of an equity share larger than the discounted expected value of the dividend stream 
is reminiscent of the value of the resale option in Harrison and Kreps (1978). The 
novelty here is that the value of this resale option depends on monetary policy: 
through the effect that monetary policy has on asset reallocation and the determina-
tion of the marginal investor valuation,  ε ⁎ , in the OTC round.
Given  p t  ϕ t m ≡  ( ε ⁎ +  ϕ s ) y t ,  ϕ t m / ϕ t+1 m = μ / γ t+1 ,  E t  y t+1 =  E tγ t+1  y t =  γ –  y t , and 
(14), the Euler equation (16) can be written as
(18)  1 =  1 _ 
1 + i  [1 + αθ ∫  ε ⁎  
 ε H 
 ε −  ε 
⁎ _
 ε ⁎ +  ϕ s  dG (ε) ] . 
The left side is the real cost of purchasing an additional unit of real money balances 
(1 unit of the numéraire good). The right side is the discounted expected value of 
bringing an additional unit of real money balances into the OTC round of the follow-
ing period. Condition (18) makes clear that an increase in the nominal rate,  i , acts as 
a tax on real money balances: it reduces the incentives to carry money, which in turn 
reduces the valuation of the marginal investor,  ε ⁎ . As a result, the real equity price 
falls, as is clear from (17). Notice that this result holds both, if the increase in the 
nominal rate is associated with an increase in expected inflation,  π , as in part (i) of 
Proposition 2, and if the increase in the nominal rate is associated with an increase 
in the real interest rate,  r , as in part (i) of Proposition 3. The intuitive reason why  ε ⁎ 
falls in response to an increase in the nominal rate has to do with the fact that while 
in general equilibrium a change in  i affects investors’ valuations of both equity and 
money, it affects the incentive to hold money relatively more.
To understand this, first suppose the increase in  i is associated with an increase in 
expected inflation,  π , or equivalently, the money growth rate,  μ . The pricing equa-
tion (18) indicates that the  first-order (partial equilibrium) effect of  π is to reduce the 
real value of a dollar, and that this is achieved by a reduction in  ε ⁎ , i.e., a reduction 
in the equilibrium  cum-dividend value of an equity share that money is used to buy. 
The Euler equation for equity, (17) does not depend on  π directly; only indirectly 
through the general equilibrium effect of  π on real money balances. The direct effect 
of expected inflation on the real value of money is larger than the indirect effect on 
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the price of equity, and the marginal investor valuation,  ε ⁎ , decreases as the investor 
that was marginal under the lower inflation rate tilts his portfolio away from money 
toward equity in an attempt to avoid the inflation tax.
For another angle on this logic, suppose the background monetary policy is the 
Friedman rule, as in Corollary 1. In this case the opportunity cost of holding money 
is 0, i.e.,  i = 0 , so investors are willing to hold enough real money balances to sati-
ate their random demand for liquidity in the OTC round, i.e., (18) implies  ε ⁎ =  ε H 
if  i = 0 . Intuitively, this means that the highest valuation investors (those with 
valuations equal to  ε H ) who contact dealers are able to absorb the whole supply of 
equity shares in the dealer market, and the equilibrium equity price reflects only 
their valuation. If the inflation rate is higher than the target level prescribed by the 
Friedman rule, then the opportunity cost of holding money is positive, and therefore 
the highest valuation investors are budget constrained in the OTC round as they no 
longer choose to hold enough real money balances to be financially unconstrained 
for every realization of the  next-period valuation ( formally, (18) implies  ε ⁎ <  ε H 
if  i > 0 ). Since investors with valuation  ε H are no longer able to absorb the whole 
asset supply traded in the dealer market, investors with lower valuations are now 
able to purchase some equity shares, and therefore the marginal investor who prices 
equity has valuation  ε ⁎ <  ε H . In sum, as  π increases, aggregate real balances fall, 
investors with relatively high valuations become less able to express their valua-
tions, and as a result, the asset is held, and priced, by investors with lower valuations.
To conclude, suppose the increase in  i is associated with an increase in the real 
rate,  r . In this case we have shown that  ε ⁎ also falls, again reflecting the fact that an 
increase in the real rate reduces the value of money relatively more than the value of 
an equity share. The reason is that, since equity dominates money in terms of rate of 
return (equity yields a real dividend and money does not), an equilibrium with val-
ued money necessarily requires that money be a relatively better store of value than 
equity (formally,  μ <  μ –). This means that while an increase in  r reduces investors’ 
valuations of both equity and money, it has a relatively smaller effect on the incen-
tive to hold equity, which necessarily has a more “ front-loaded” payoff structure 
than money in the monetary equilibrium.
IV. Empirical Analysis
According to the theory, the real asset price decreases in response to an entirely 
unanticipated and permanent increase in the nominal interest rate (part (i) of 
Proposition 2 and part (i) of Proposition 3, together with (14)). The mechanism 
through which the increase in the nominal rate is transmitted to the asset price is a 
reduction in turnover liquidity, i.e., a reduction in the resale option value, accom-
panied by a nonpositive change in trade volume (parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 5). 
These two theoretical results suggest two hypotheses that can be tested with price 
and turnover data: (i) surprise increases in the nominal rate reduce the marketwide 
stock return (and possibly trade volume), and (ii) the strength of the mechanism 
depends on the turnover liquidity of the stocks (e.g., as proxied for by the turnover 
rate of the stock). The following proposition (based on a generalization of the theory 
with multiple assets indexed by  s ∈  {1, 2, …, N} that differ in terms of the trading 
frequency,  α s ) provides a formal theoretical basis for these two hypotheses.
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PROPOSITION 6: In the recursive monetary equilibrium, (i )  ∂ log  ϕ s / ∂ π < 0 , 
(ii)  ∂ log  ϕ s / ∂ r < 0 , (iii)  ∂ 2 log  ϕ s / (∂ α s ∂ π) < 0 , (iv)  ∂ 2 log  ϕ s / (∂ α s ∂ r) < 0 .
Thus, theory predicts a negative  semi-elasticity of the real equity price with 
respect to the nominal interest rate, regardless of whether the increase in the nominal 
rate is associated with an increase in the expected inflation rate,  π , or an increase in 
the real rate,  r (parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 6). Moreover, since the component 
of the asset price associated with the expected value of the resale option discussed in 
Section IIIC is increasing in the turnover of the asset, and turnover is an increasing 
function of  α s , theory predicts that the magnitude of this  semi-elasticity is larger for 
stocks with higher turnover (parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition 6).
A. Data
We use daily time series for all individual common stocks in the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP).16 The daily stock return from CRSP takes into account changes in 
prices and accrued  dividend payment, i.e., the return of stock  s on day  t is 
  t s =  ( ( (P t s +  D t s )/ P t−1 s ) − 1) × 100 , where  P t s is the ex dividend dollar price of 
stock  s on day  t , and  D t s denotes the dollar dividend paid per share of stock  s on 
day  t . As a measure of trade volume for each stock, we construct the daily turn-
over rate from CRSP, i.e.,    t s =   t s/ A t s , where   t s is the trade volume of stock  s 
on day  t (measured as the total number of shares traded) and  A t s is the number of 
outstanding shares of stock  s on day  t . Whenever we use an average, e.g., of equity 
returns or turnover rates across a set of stocks, we use the arithmetic average, e.g., 
  t I =  (1/n) ∑ s=1 
n  t s and    t I =  (1/n) ∑ s=1 
n   t s are the average return and the aver-
age turnover rate for the universe of  n common stocks listed in the NYSE.17
As a proxy for the policy (nominal interest) rate, we use the rate on the nearest 
Eurodollar futures contract due to mature after the FOMC policy announcement, 
as in Rigobon and  Sack (2004).18 Specifically, we use the  3-month Eurodollar 
futures rate produced by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group (CME Group) 
and  supplied by Datastream. In some of our empirical estimations, we use the 
 tick-by-tick nominal interest rate implied by  30-day federal funds futures and 
16 We report results for NASDAQ stocks in online Appendix Section D.D3.
17 We report results for  value-weighted returns in online Appendix Section D.D4.
18 Eurodollar futures are based on a $1 million face value  3-month maturity Eurodollar time deposit. These 
futures contracts mature during the conventional IMM (International Monetary Market) dates in the months of 
March, June, September, or December, extending outward 10 years into the future. In addition, at any point in 
time, there are  so-called  3-month Eurodollar serial contracts extending 4 months into the future that mature in 
months that are not conventional IMM dates. For example, at the beginning of January 2016, there are contracts 
maturing in  mid-March,  mid-June,  mid-September, and  mid-December 2016, through 2025. There are also serial 
contracts maturing in  mid-January,  mid-February,  mid-April, and  mid-May 2016. Thus, depending on the  timing 
of the FOMC announcement, the nearest contract to mature may expire between 0 and 30 days after the announce-
ment. Current quotes are available at http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/stir/eurodollar_quotes_
settlements_futures.html. An advantage of using a futures rate as a proxy for the “policy rate” is that its movement 
on dates of FOMC policy announcements reflects policy surprises only and does not reflect anticipated policy 
changes. The importance of focusing on the surprise component of policy announcements (rather than on the 
anticipated component) in order to identify the response of asset prices to monetary policy was originally pointed 
out by Kuttner (2001) and has been emphasized by the literature since then, e.g., Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and 
Rigobon and Sack (2004). Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2007) offers empirical evidence supporting the use 
of futures contracts as an effective proxy for policy expectations and discusses their use to define policy shocks.
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 consider a  high-frequency measure of the unexpected change in the nominal  policy 
rate in a narrow 30-minute time window around the FOMC announcement. The 
sample we analyze runs from January 3, 1994 to December 31, 2007.19 The  sample 
includes between 1,300 and 1,800 stocks (depending on the time period) and 
133 FOMC announcement dates.20
In the following subsections, we use the data described above to estimate the 
sign and magnitude of the effect of monetary policy on stock returns and turnover. 
In Subsection IVB, we estimate these effects for FOMC announcement days for 
a broad index of stocks. In Subsection IVC, we document that the strength of the 
effect of monetary policy on stock returns differs systematically with the turnover 
liquidity of the stock. In Subsection IVD, we go a step further and estimate the 
dynamic effects of the policy announcement on returns and turnover.
B. Aggregate Announcement-Day Effects
The empirical literature has followed several approaches to estimate the impact 
of monetary policy on the stock market. A popular one, known as  event-study analy-
sis, consists of estimating the market reaction to monetary policy surprises on a sub-
sample of trading days consisting exclusively of the days of FOMC announcements 
(we denote this subsample  S 1 ). Let  i t denote the day  t “policy rate” (in our case, the 
CME Group  3-month Eurodollar future with closest expiration date at or after day  t , 
expressed in percentage terms) and define  Δ i  t ≡  i  t −  i  t−1 . The  event-study analysis 
consists of running the following regression:
(19)  Y t I = a + bΔ  i  t +  ϵ t 
for  t ∈  S 1 , with  Y t I =   t I, where  ϵ t is an exogenous shock to the asset price.21 We 
refer to the estimator  b as the  event-study estimator (or  E-based estimator, for short).
A concern with (19) is that it does not take into account the fact that the  policy rate 
on the right side may itself be reacting to asset prices (a simultaneity bias) and that a 
number of other variables (e.g., news about economic outlook) are likely to have an 
impact on both the policy rate and asset prices (an omitted variables bias). This con-
cern motivates us to also consider two other estimators: the  heteroskedasticity-based 
19 We start our sample period in 1994 because prior to 1994, policy changes in the federal funds target were 
unannounced and frequently occurred between FOMC meetings. From 1994 onward, all changes are announced 
and most coincided with FOMC meetings, so as policy announcement dates we use the dates of FOMC  meetings 
obtained from the web site of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (http://www.federalreserve.
gov/monetarypolicy/fomccalendars.htm). See Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) for more  discussion on the exact tim-
ing of policy announcements.
20 Our full sample contains 135 policy dates. We discard two dates: 9/13/2001 and 9/17/2001 (the two atypical 
FOMC announcements in the immediate aftermath of 9/11/2001). One of our estimation procedures requires data 
involving first differences in variables on the policy day and on the day preceding the policy day. In that case, we 
follow Rigobon and Sack (2004) and discard three additional policy dates because they are preceded by either one 
or two holidays in financial markets. Another of our estimation procedures relies on  high-frequency market activity 
in a narrow time interval around the exact time of the monetary policy announcement. In this case, we use the data 
from Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016) that consist of 118 scheduled policy dates. For each trading day, we  discard 
observations whose return or turnover rate on that given day is in the top or bottom one percentile.
21 In the context of monetary policy, this approach was originally used by Cook and Hahn (1989) and has been 
followed by a large number of papers, e.g., Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Kuttner 
(2001), and Thorbecke (1997).
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estimator ( H-based  estimator,  for short) proposed by Rigobon and  Sack (2004), 
and a version of the  event-study estimator that relies on an instrumental variable 
identification strategy that uses intraday  high-frequency  tick-by-tick interest rate 
data. The  H-based estimator identifies the response of asset prices based on the 
 heteroskedasticity of monetary policy shocks. The  high-frequency instrumental 
 variable estimator (HFIV estimator, for short) addresses the omitted variable bias and 
the concern that the Eurodollar futures rate may itself respond to market conditions 
on policy announcement days, by focusing on changes in a proxy for the policy rate 
in a very narrow  30-minute window around the time of the FOMC announcement.22 
Table 1 presents the baseline results. The first  column corresponds to the  event-based 
estimation, the second column corresponds to the  heteroskedasticity-based estima-
tion, and the third column corresponds to the  high-frequency instrumental variable 
estimation. Returns are expressed in percentage terms. The first row presents esti-
mates of the reaction of the marketwide NYSE return to monetary policy. The point 
estimate for  b in (19) is  − 5.47 . This means that a  1 basis point (bp) increase in the 
policy rate causes a decrease of  5.47 basis points (bps) in the stock market return 
on the day of the policy announcement.23 The analogous  H-based point estimate 
is  − 11.31 . These results are in line with those reported in previous studies.24 The 
HFIV point estimate is  − 9.38 , implying that a  25  bp surprise increase in the policy 
rate causes a decrease in the stock market return of  2.34 percentage points (pps) on 
the day of the policy announcement.25 Figure 1 shows a scatterplot with the unex-
pected change in the policy rate ( measure by the  high-frequency change in the fed 
funds future rate) on the horizontal axis, and the  announcement-day marketwide 
stock return on the vertical axis, both expressed in bps. The negative relationship 
between stock returns and fed funds rate surprises is readily visible from the fitted 
line.
Previous studies have not clearly identified the specific economic mechanism that 
transmits monetary policy shocks to the stock market. Conventional  asset-pricing 
theory suggests three broad immediate reasons why an unexpected policy nomi-
nal rate increase may lead to a decline in stock prices. It may be associated with a 
decrease in expected dividend growth, with a rise in the future real interest rates used 
to discount dividends, or with an increase in the expected excess returns (i.e., equity 
premia) associated with holding stocks. Our theory formalizes a new mechanism: 
the reduction in turnover liquidity caused by the increase in the opportunity cost of 
holding the nominal assets that are routinely used to settle financial transactions. 
To begin assessing this mechanism, we again estimate  b in (19), and the analogous 
22 In the online Appendix we discuss the derivation of the  H-based estimator (Section B.B1) and describe the 
construction of the HFIV estimator (Section B.B2).
23 The  R 2 indicates that  14 percent of the variance of equity prices in days of FOMC policy announcements is 
associated with news about monetary policy.
24 The comparable  event-based estimates in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), which focuses on a different sample 
period and measures stock returns using the  value-weighted return from CRSP, range between  − 2.55 and  − 4.68 . 
The comparable  heteroskedasticity-based estimates in Rigobon and Sack (2004), which uses a different series for the 
Eurodollar forward rate, are  − 6.81 for the S&P 500 index,  − 6.5 for the WIL5000 index,  − 9.42 for the NASDAQ, 
and  − 4.85 for the DJIA.
25 In comparing the  E-based,  H-based, and HFIV estimates, one should bear in mind that the number of policy 
dates varies slightly between the three estimation methods, as explained in footnote 20.
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 H-based and HFIV estimates, but with  Y t I =    t I −     t−1 I , i.e., we use the change in 
the daily turnover rate averaged over all traded stocks as the dependent variable.
The estimated effects of monetary policy announcements on the daily 
 marketwide  NYSE turnover rate are reported in the second row of Table  1. 
According  to the  E-based estimate, a  100  bp increase in the policy rate causes a 
change in the level of the marketwide turnover rate on the day of the policy announce-
ment equal to  − 0.0021 .26 The daily marketwide turnover rate for our sample period 
is  0.0048 (i.e., on average, stocks turn over  1.22 times during a typical year com-
posed of 252 trading days), which means that according to the  E-based estimate, an 
increase in the policy rate of  25  bps causes a reduction in the marketwide turnover 
rate on the day of the policy announcement of about  10 percent of its typical level. 
The HFIV estimate for a  100 bp increase in the policy rate is  − 0.0052 ,  implying 
that a  25 bp increase in the policy rate causes a reduction in the marketwide turnover 
rate of about  27 percent of its typical level.
26 The  R 2 indicates that  3  percent of the variance of the daily turnover rate in days of FOMC policy  announcements 
is associated with unexpected changes in monetary policy.
Table 1—Empirical Response of NYSE Marketwide Stock Returns and Turnover 
to Monetary Policy
E-based H-based HFIV
Estimate SD Estimate SD Estimate SD
Return −5.47 1.30 −11.31 4.53 −9.38 2.86
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Figure 1. Unexpected Component of the Change in the Policy Rate on FOMC Announcement Dates  
and Announcement-Day Marketwide NYSE Stock Returns
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C. Disaggregative  Announcement-Day Effects
Another way to inspect the  turnover-liquidity transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy is to exploit the  cross-sectional variation in turnover rates that exists 
across stocks. Our theory implies that the magnitude of the change in the stock 
return induced by a change in the policy rate will depend on the turnover liquidity 
of the stock (e.g., as measured by the turnover rate of the stock). To test this predic-
tion, we sort stocks into portfolios according to their turnover liquidity, as follows. 
For each FOMC announcement date,  t , we calculate    t s as the average turnover rate 
of an individual stock  s over all trading days during the four weeks prior to the day 
of the policy announcement. We then sort all stocks into  20 portfolios by assign-
ing stocks with    t s ranked between the  [5 (i − 1) ] th percentile and  (5i) th percentile 
to the  i th portfolio, for  i = 1, …, 20 . Hence, the average turnover rate over the 
 four-week period prior to the announcement date for a stock in the  i th portfolio is 
at least as large as that of a stock in the  (i − 1) th portfolio. In Table 2, the Turnover 
column  reports the annual turnover rate (based on 252 trading days per year) corre-
sponding to each of the  20 portfolios. For example, portfolio  1 turns over  0.17 times 
per year while portfolio  20 turns over  3.57 times per year.27
For each of the  20 portfolios, Table 2 reports the  E-based,  H-based, and HFIV 
estimates of the  announcement-day responses of the return to a  1 percentage point 
(pp) increase in the policy rate. All the estimates are negative, as predicted by the 
theory. Also, the magnitude of the (statistically significant) estimates increases with 
the turnover liquidity of the portfolio. For example, according to the HFIV esti-
mates, a  1  bp increase in the policy rate causes a decrease of  6.44  bps in the return 
of portfolio  1 and a decrease of  16.40   bps in the return of portfolio  20 . For all 
three estimation methods, the relative differences in responses across portfolios are 
of similar magnitude. For example, the response of the return of the most liquid 
portfolio is about  2.5 times larger than the response of the least liquid portfolio.28 
Figure 2 shows the  announcement-day returns of portfolio  1 (the crosses) and port-
folio  20 (the circles), along with their respective fitted lines. The larger magnitude 
of the response of the more liquid portfolio is evident.
As an alternative way to estimate the heterogeneous responses of returns to mone-
tary policy shocks for stocks with different turnover liquidity, we ran an  event-study 
regression of individual stock returns (for the universe of stocks listed in the NYSE) 
on changes in the policy rate, an interaction term between the change in the policy 
rate and individual stock daily turnover rate, and several controls. As before,  Δ  i  t 
denotes the monetary policy shock on policy announcement day  t (measured by 
27 Our motivation for constructing these  liquidity-based portfolios is twofold. First, at a daily frequency, 
 individual stock returns are extremely noisy; by grouping stocks into portfolios based on some characteristic(s) 
related to returns, it becomes possible to see average return differences. Second,  stock-specific turnover measures 
are  time-varying, i.e., the turnover rate of a particular stock may change over time. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
also examines the responses of more disaggregated indices to monetary policy shocks. Specifically, they estimate 
the responses of 10 industry portfolios constructed from CRSP returns as in Fama and French (1988) but find that 
the precision of their estimates is not sufficient to reject the hypothesis of an equal reaction for all 10 industries.
28 In online Appendix Section B.B3, we report similar results from an alternative procedure that sorts stocks into 
portfolios according to the strength of individual stock returns to changes in an aggregate (marketwide)  measure 
of turnover. This alternative sorting criterion allows us to control for other differences across stocks, such as the 
conventional risk factors used in empirical  asset-pricing models.
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the change between day  t and day  t − 1 in the  3-month Eurodollar futures contract 
with nearest expiration after the day  t FOMC policy announcement), and    t s is the 
 average turnover rate of the individual stock  s over all the trading days during the 
four weeks prior to the day of the policy announcement of day  t . Let  Δi and   denote 
Table 2—Empirical Responses of Stock Returns to Monetary Policy for NYSE 
Liquidity Portfolios (1994–2007 Sample)
E-based H-based HFIV
Portfolio Turnover Estimate SD Estimate SD Estimate SD
1 0.17 −3.74 0.98 −7.18 2.76 −6.44 1.80
2 0.32 −3.81 1.03 −8.40 3.66 −5.81 2.03
3 0.43 −3.94 1.47 −7.49 3.99 −6.40 2.81
4 0.52 −3.63 1.51 −7.58 4.02 −6.61 2.99
5 0.59 −3.97 1.23 −9.98 4.78 −5.80 2.55
6 0.66 −4.06 1.10 −9.36 4.26 −6.01 2.29
7 0.73 −4.96 1.10 −11.41 4.76 −7.37 2.38
8 0.80 −4.56 1.23 −9.83 4.41 −7.74 2.93
9 0.87 −4.25 1.58 −9.53 4.80 −7.56 3.48
10 0.94 −5.32 1.19 −11.27 4.58 −8.74 2.82
11 1.01 −5.63 1.30 −11.05 4.47 −9.32 2.85
12 1.11 −5.53 1.39 −10.39 4.24 −9.67 3.11
13 1.21 −5.93 1.31 −11.68 4.33 −10.09 2.45
14 1.32 −5.81 1.30 −12.24 4.56 −9.95 2.75
15 1.45 −6.84 1.58 −12.72 4.42 −11.46 2.89
16 1.60 −6.60 1.62 −13.38 5.02 −12.31 3.52
17 1.79 −7.22 1.57 −15.44 5.79 −12.66 3.41
18 2.07 −7.41 1.76 −14.80 5.53 −13.31 3.78
19 2.50 −7.52 2.01 −14.70 5.75 −14.10 4.35
20 3.57 −8.62 2.15 −17.85 6.66 −16.40 4.56
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Figure 2. Unexpected Component of the Change in the Policy Rate on FOMC Announcement Dates and 
Announcement-Day NYSE Stock Returns for Portfolio 1 (Circles) and Portfolio 20 (Crosses)
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the sample averages of  Δ i  t and    t s, respectively, and define  ‾   t s ≡  (   t s −  ) and 
‾ Δ i  t ≡  (Δ i  t − Δi) . The regression we fit is
(20)   t s =  β 0 +  β 1 Δ i  t +  β 2    t s +  β 3 
_
   t s ×  ‾ Δ i  t
  +  D s +  D t +  β 4  (Δ i  t ) 2 +  β 5  (   t s) 2 +  ε st , 
where  D s is a stock fixed effect,  D t is a quarterly time dummy, and  ε st is the error term 
corresponding to stock  s on policy announcement day  t . The time dummies con-
trol for omitted variables that may affect the return of all stocks in the NYSE over 
time. The stock fixed effects control for the effects that permanent stock character-
istics not included explicitly in the regression may have on individual stock returns. 
We include the interaction term  ‾   t s ×  ‾ Δ i  t to estimate how the effect of changes 
in the policy rate on individual stock returns varies across stocks with different 
turnover liquidity. The coefficient of interest is  β 3 , i.e., we want to test whether 
changes in the  policy rate affect individual stock returns through the  stock-specific 
 turnover-liquidity channel. The estimate of  β 3 can help us evaluate whether increases 
(reductions) in the policy rate cause larger reductions (increases) in returns of stocks 
with a larger turnover rate, i.e., whether  β 3 < 0 .
Table 3 reports the results from estimating nine different specifications based 
on (20). Specification (I) excludes  D s ,  D t , the interaction term,  ‾   t s ×  ‾ Δ i  t, and the 
squared terms,  (Δ i  t ) 2 and  (   t s) 2 . Specification (II) adds the interaction term to speci-
fication (I). Specification (III) adds  D s to specification (II). Specification (IV) adds  D t 
to specification (II). Specification (V) adds  D s to specification (IV). Specifications 
(VI), (VII), (VIII), and (IX) each add the squared terms  (Δ i  t ) 2 and  (   t s) 2 to specifi-
cations (II), (III), (IV), and (V), respectively. In all specifications, all estimates are 
significant at  1 percent level.
The estimates of  β 1 lie near  − 5.5 in all specifications, implying that a  1   bp 
increase in the policy rate reduces the return of a stock with average turnover by 
about  5.5  bps on the day of the policy announcement.29 The estimate of interest,  β 3 , 
is large and negative in all specifications. The negative and statistically significant 
estimates of  β 3 indicate that the magnitude of the negative effect of unexpected 
changes in the policy rate on  announcement-day equity returns is larger for stocks 
with higher turnover liquidity. To interpret the magnitude of the estimates, consider 
a stock  A with a daily turnover rate equal to  0.014 (i.e., a stock in liquidity portfo-
lio  20 ) and an equity  B with an annual turnover rate equal to  0.0007 (i.e., a stock 
in liquidity portfolio  1 ). Then, for example, according to specification (IX), the 
estimate of  β 3 is  − 487 , implying that a  1  bp increase in the policy rate reduces the 
 announcement-day return by  β 1 + 2 β 4 +  β 3 (   t A −  ) ≈ −10 bps for equity  A and 
by  β 1 + 2 β 4 +  β 3 (   t B −  ) ≈ − 3 bps for equity  B . These estimates are quite close 
to the  E-based estimates for portfolio  20 and for portfolio  1 reported in Table 2. 
Together with the findings reported in Table 1 and Table 2, the results in Table 3 
29 Recall the average daily turnover in our sample is  0.0048 .
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 provide additional evidence that turnover liquidity is a quantitatively important 
channel that transmits monetary policy shocks to asset prices.30
D. Dynamic Effects
In the previous section we documented the effect of monetary policy shocks on 
equity returns and turnover on the day the policy announcement takes place. While 
the turnover liquidity channel highlighted by our theory can generate the effects 
on announcement days documented in the previous section, the theoretical channel 
is eminently dynamic. In the theory, persistent changes in the nominal rate affect 
stock returns because they imply persistent changes in the future resale value of the 
stock. To study the dynamic effects of monetary policy on prices and turnover rates, 
we conduct a vector autoregression (VAR) analysis on the sample consisting of all 
trading days between January 3, 1994 and December 31, 2007.
The baseline VAR we estimate consists of three variables, i.e.,  { i  t ,   t I,    t I} , 
where  i t ,   t I, and    t I are the daily measures of the policy rate, the stock return, and 
turnover described in Sections  IVA and IVB.31 The lag length is set to  10 .32 To 
30 In online Appendix Section D.D2 we show that our estimates of  β 3 based on (20) are robust to including a 
number of additional controls, such as sensitivity to the three most common  Fama-French factors, industry dum-
mies, and a  firm-specific measure of leverage (reliance on bank debt). We also ran regression (20) (on the whole 
sample,  1994–2007) including stock and time fixed effects and dropping all other controls, and found an estimate 
of  β 3 equal to  − 339.61 (significant at the  1 percent level). The estimates of  β 3 in Table 3 are significant at the  5 
percent level if the standard error is clustered by calendar date.
31 In Section IVB, we used the change in the  3-month Eurodollar futures rate on the day of the FOMC announce-
ment as a proxy for the unexpected component of the change in the true policy rate, i.e., the effective federal funds 
rate. In this section, we instead regard the  3-month Eurodollar futures rate as the policy rate itself. We do this 
because, at a daily frequency, the effective federal funds rate is very volatile for much of our sample, e.g., due to 
institutional considerations, such as “settlement Wednesdays.” The path of the  3-month Eurodollar futures rate is 
quite similar to the effective federal funds rate, but it does not display the large  regulation-induced weekly swings. 
In any case, we have also performed the estimation in this section using the daily effective federal funds rate instead 
of the Eurodollar futures rate, and the results for returns and turnover are quite similar.
32 The Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggests  10 lags, while Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) suggest  5 lags. We adopted the formulation 
with  10 lags, but both formulations deliver similar estimates.
Table 3—Effects of Monetary Policy on Stock Returns of Individual NYSE Stocks
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
∆ i  t −5.37 −5.56 −5.60 −5.83 −5.82 −5.21 −5.23 −5.30 −5.30
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.099) (0.098) (0.110) (0.112)
   t 
s 2,894 3,094 2,920 1,256 589 4,389 4,454 2,832 2,190
(148) (147) (181) (160) (207) (315) (370) (333) (407)
 ‾   t s ×  ‾ ∆ i  t −553 −557 −492 −491 −554 −560 −485 −487
(29) (30) (30) (32) (29) (31) (30) (32)
 D s yes yes yes yes
 D  t yes yes yes yes
 (∆ i  t ) 2 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
 (   t s) 2 −53,852 −57,208 −63,775 −56,275
(14,751) (15,093) (14,887) (15,597)
 R 2 0.0241 0.0286 0.0286 0.0778 0.0778 0.0290 0.0290 0.0783 0.0784
Notes: Both the interest rate and stock returns are expressed in basis points. Each column reports the coefficients 
from a separate pooled OLS regression based on (20). Number of observations: 205,760. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses. All estimates are significant at the 1 percent level.
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 identify the effects of monetary policy shocks, we apply an identification scheme 
based on an external  high-frequency instrument.33
Figure 3 reports the impulse responses of the policy rate, the average  cumulative 
stock return between day  t and day  t + j defined by   
–
 t, t+j I ≡  ∏ s=1 
j  t+s I , and the 
average turnover rate, to a  1 bp increase in the policy rate.34 The  99 percent confi-
dence intervals for  { i  t ,   t I,    t I} are computed using a recursive wild bootstrap based 
on 10,000 replications.35 The top and bottom rows show responses for forecast hori-
zons of 30 days and 120 days, respectively. The path of the policy rate is very per-
sistent (it remains significantly above the level prevailing prior to the shock for about 
18 months). The middle panels in Figure 3 show the response of daily cumulative 
stock returns. On impact, in response to the  1 bp unexpected increase in the nominal 
rate, the stock return falls by about  9.4 bps. The magnitude of this response on the 
day of the policy shock is basically the same as the HFIV point estimate reported 
in Table 1. The negative effect on the stock price is persistent (the upper bound of 
the  99 percent confidence remains below zero for about  30 days). The right panels 
33 See online Appendix Section B.B4 for details. The basic idea of structural vector autoregression (SVAR) 
identification using instruments external to the VAR can be traced back to Romer and Romer (1989) and has been 
adopted in a number of more recent papers, including Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002), Hamilton (2003), Kilian 
(2008a, b), Stock and Watson (2012), Mertens and Ravn (2013), and Gertler and Karadi (2015).
34 The impulse response for the cumulative return illustrates the path of  { 
_
  −1, j−1 I } , where  j = 1, 2, … indexes 
the number of days after the policy announcement.
35 The procedure is described in online Appendix Section B.B4. See Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) for a formal 
econometric analysis of this method. We compute the confidence bands for  { 
_
  t, t+j I } by compounding the confi-
dence bands of the return response  {  t I} (i.e., in the same way we compute  { 
_

















































































































Figure 3. Empirical Impulse Responses to a 1 Basis Point Increase in the Policy Rate
Notes: Solid lines are point estimates. Broken lines are the 95 percent confidence bands.
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in Figure 3 show the response of the level of the daily turnover rate. On impact, a  1 
bp surprise increase in the nominal rate causes a change in the level of the turnover 
rate equal to  − 0.00005 , which is the same as the HFIV point estimate reported in 
Table 1. According to the estimated impulse response, it takes about 1 day for the 
turnover rate to recover one-half of the initial drop. However, beyond that point, 
the negative effect of the increase in the policy rate on turnover is persistent (e.g., it 
takes  43 days for it to become statistically insignificant).
In order to inspect the  turnover-liquidity transmission mechanism further, we 
exploit the  cross-sectional variation in turnover rates across stocks and carry out the 
same VAR analysis of this section but individually on each of  20 liquidity  portfolios 
of stocks, sorted on turnover liquidity.36 Figure 4 shows the estimated impulse 
responses (to a  1 bp unexpected increase in the policy rate) of the  cumulative returns 
of each of the 20 liquidity portfolios for a forecast horizon of 30 days. In the  figure, 
the darker impulse responses correspond to the portfolios with higher turnover liquid-
ity (e.g., the lightest impulse response is for portfolio  1 and the darkest, for portfo-
lio  20 ). To further illustrate the results, Figure 5 reports the impulse responses and 
the corresponding  99 percent confidence intervals of the cumulative portfolio return 
to a  1 bp unexpected increase in the  policy rate for a forecast horizon of 30 days, for 
portfolios  1 ,  10 , and  20 . Notice that the  announcement-day  portfolio-by-portfolio 
responses estimated by the VAR line up well with the  portfolio-by-portfolio HFIV 
estimates reported in Table 2. As in Section IVC, we again find that on the announce-
ment day, the negative responses of returns to an unexpected increase in the nominal 
rate tend to be larger in magnitude for portfolios with higher turnover liquidity. 
However, here these responses appear to be estimated much more precisely than in 
Table 2.37 Also, notice that, as will be the case in the quantitative theory, the price 
responses of the portfolios with larger turnover liquidity are not only larger in mag-
nitude on impact, but also tend to be more persistent.38
In this section  we have provided empirical evidence consistent with the 
 turnover-liquidity transmission mechanism of monetary policy: a persistent increase 
in the nominal rate reduces the resale value of stocks, and this reduction in turnover 
liquidity is reflected in a persistent price reduction and higher future stock returns.39
36 In Section IVC we  re-sorted stocks into liquidity portfolios for each day in our sample of FOMC announce-
ment dates (based on the average daily turnover rate over the four weeks prior to each FOMC announcement). For 
the  high-frequency VAR that we estimate in this section, stocks are resorted into one of 20 liquidity portfolios every 
day. On days with no FOMC announcement, the sorting is based on daily turnover rate. On FOMC announcement 
days, stocks are sorted based on their turnover rate two days prior to the announcement. Since the ranking of a given 
stock in terms of turnover tends to be quite persistent, all the sorting schemes described here deliver similar results.
37 Aside from the fact that the VAR specification is more flexible than (19), our VAR estimation also relies on 
the HFIV identification scheme. In fact, notice that even for the simple specification (19), Table 1 and Table 2 show 
that in general, the HFIV identification strategy by itself already delivers estimates that are more precise and more 
statistically significant than the  E-based and  H-based estimates.
38 Based on the  announcement-day evidence alone, one might conjecture that the differential return response 
on impact across liquidity portfolios may simply reflect that the prices of stocks with lower turnover liquidity take 
longer to react to the FOMC shock. This conjecture, however, does not seem to be supported by the VAR evidence 
in Figures 4 and 5. The conjecture is also not supported by the additional regression analysis we carry out in online 
Appendix Section D.D1, where we estimate the effect of an unexpected policy shock on day  t on   
–
 t−1, t+1 I , i.e., the 
cumulative stock return for the  two-day horizon after the policy announcement.
39 Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) is one of a few papers that has tried to identify the economic forces behind 
the negative effect of nominal rate increases on stock returns. They use a VAR to decompose excess equity returns 
into components attributable to news about dividends, real interest rates, and future excess returns. They find the 
 component associated with future excess returns accounts for the largest part of the response, i.e., an increase in the 
policy rate lowers stock prices mostly by increasing the expected equity premium. Bernanke and Kuttner  speculate 
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V. Quantitative Analysis
The theoretical results we used to motivate the empirical analysis of Section IV 
(e.g., part (i) of Proposition 2, part (i) of Proposition 3, and parts (i) and (ii) of 
Proposition 5) correspond to a permanent, unanticipated increase in the nominal 
rate, which, while suggestive, is somewhat different from the policy shocks under-
lying the empirical estimates of Section IV. Thus in order to assess the predictions 
and quantitative performance of the theory, in this section we formulate, calibrate, 
and simulate a generalized version of the model of Section I.
We generalize the model along three dimensions. First, we incorporate aggre-
gate uncertainty in the path of monetary policy, represented by changes in the nom-
inal interest rate implemented via  open-market operations. This extension allows 
us to consider theoretical experiments that resemble more closely what goes on in 
 financial markets, in the sense that while investors may be surprised by the tim-
ing and size of changes in the nominal rate, they take into account a  probability 
 distribution over future paths of the monetary policy so these changes are not 
this could come about via some unspecified mechanism through which tight money increases the riskiness of 
stocks (or decreases the investor’s willingness to bear risk). The  turnover-liquidity mechanism we have identified is 





















Figure 4. Empirical Impulse Responses of Cumulative Stock Returns  
for the 20 NYSE Liquidity Portfolios
Notes: The figure reports responses to a 1 basis point increase in the policy rate. Darker shades correspond to more 
liquid portfolios.
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entirely unexpected. Second, we extend the model so that the innovations to the 
nominal policy rate may be associated with innovations to the expected inflation 
rate (as in the propositions of Section III), as well as with innovations to the real 
interest rate. This extension allows us to quantify the  turnover-liquidity mechanism 
for settings where changes in the nominal rate may be associated with changes 
in the expected inflation rate as well as with changes in the real rate. Third, we 
extend the model to the case of multiple equity classes that differ in their liquid-
ity properties. This extension allows us to provide additional evidence for the 
 turnover-liquidity mechanism by exploiting the  cross-sectional heterogeneity and 
using it to assess the quantitative theoretical effects of monetary policy on the cross 
section of equity returns.
A. Generalized Model
There are  N equity classes, each indexed by  s ∈ ℕ =  {1, 2, … , N} . The out-
standing quantity of equity shares of class  s is  A s . Since the focus is on the impli-
cation of liquidity differences across equity classes, we assume each class gives 
the same dividend  y t , which follows the same stochastic process described in the 
 one-asset model of Section I. An investor’s period  t valuation of the dividend of any 
equity is distributed independently over time and across investors, with cumulative 
distribution function  G , just as in the  one-asset setup.
Figure 5. Empirical Impulse Responses of Cumulative Stock Returns  
for Selected NYSE Liquidity Portfolios
Notes: The figure reports responses to a 1 basis point increase in the policy rate. Solid lines are point estimates. 
Broken lines are the 95 percent confidence bands.
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We model liquidity differences as follows. In each round of OTC trade, each 
investor can trade equity class  s ∈ ℕ with probability  α s ∈  [0, 1] . The event that 
the investor is able to trade equity class  s is independent of the event that he is able 
to trade any other equity class  n ∈ ℕ . We interpret  α s as the probability that an 
individual investor contacts a dealer with whom he can trade equity class  s . This 
captures the idea that dealers are specialized in trading a particular equity class.40 
In the OTC trading round there is a competitive dealer market for each equity class. 
These markets are segmented in the following sense: (i) in the OTC trading round, 
equity  s can only be traded in market  s , and (ii) at the beginning of the period, inves-
tors partition the money they will use for trading stocks in the first subperiod into a 
cash portfolio with  N components, i.e.,  { a t ms } s∈ℕ , where  a t ms is the amount of money 
the investor chooses to have available to trade equity class  s in the OTC market of 
period  t . Each investor makes this cash rebalancing decision after having observed 
the realization of the aggregate state, but before learning which equity classes he 
will be able to trade, and before learning his individual valuation of the dividend 
(the last two assumptions keep the ex post number of investor types to a minimum). 
For simplicity, in this section we assume dealers do not hold asset inventories over-
night (and without loss, also that they do not hold money overnight).
In Section  I, we assumed a constant growth rate of the money supply, 
i.e.,  A t+1 m = μ  A t m , where  μ ∈  ℝ ++ . In this section we broaden the analysis of mon-
etary policy along three dimensions. (i) We allow the monetary authority to inject 
or withdraw money not only with lump sum taxes, but also via  open-market oper-
ations. This is a more realistic implementation of monetary policy, and makes the 
theory more flexible in that it can encompass a wider range of responses to monetary 
policy shocks. (ii) We model monetary policy as a stochastic process. This allows 
the theory to exhibit monetary policy shocks that resemble the policy surprises in 
the empirical analysis of Section IV. (iii) We allow monetary policy to affect mar-
ket outcomes by influencing the nominal rate through both of its components: the 
expected inflation rate, and the real interest rate. This allows us to assess the robust-
ness of the  turnover-liquidity mechanism to different degrees of pass-through from 
nominal rates to real rates. In summary, we will consider general monetary policy 
processes that consist of three components: an  open-market operation, a change in 
expected inflation, and a change in the real rate. Each of these components of the 
monetary policy process is modeled as follows.
In the first subperiod, each investor can always trade in a competitive market 
where the monetary authority sells  B  t  one-period  risk-free  pure-discount nominal 
bonds. A bond issued in the first subperiod of  t yields one dollar with certainty in 
the following subperiod. The dollar price of a bond in this market is denoted  q t . 
The bond market is segmented in the same way as the markets for equity shares, 
40 In the theory, differences in  α ,  θ , or  G all give rise to differences in turnover across assets. We focus on differ-
ences in  α because it is conceptually the simplest and analytically the most direct way to construct asset classes that 
differ in turnover liquidity. However, one could carry out the theoretical analysis by constructing asset classes based 
on differences in  G and  θ . Differences in  G work similarly to differences in  α (see the equivalence result proved in 
Proposition 10 in the online Appendix). With regard to differences in  θ , in a large class of models that includes this 
one, Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2005) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), the equilibrium asset price does not 
depend on  α and  θ independently, but on their product,  αθ . Thus, for  asset-pricing purposes,  differences in  α can be 
interpreted as capturing differences in the trading probability or in the bargaining power. The quantitative response 
of turnover to money shocks will typically depend on whether assets differ in  α or  θ , however.
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i.e., at the beginning of period  t , having observed the realization of the monetary 
policy variables (but before knowing which equity classes he will be able to trade 
or his  dividend valuation), each investor chooses a partition of his money hold-
ings,  { a t ms } s∈ ℕ –  , where  ℕ 
– ≡ ℕ ∪  {b} , and  a t mb denotes the amount of money the 
investor chooses to have available to trade bonds in the first subperiod of  t . The 
size of the bond issue,  B t , relative to the size of the  beginning-of-period money sup-
ply,  A t m , is denoted  ω t . That is, if there are  A t m dollars outstanding at the beginning 
of period  t , in the bond market of the first subperiod  t the government sells claims 
to  B  t =  ω t  A t m dollars payable in the following subperiod.
The  beginning-of-period money supply evolves according to
  A t+1 m =  [1 +  (1 −  q t )  ω t ] μ ̃ t  A t m , 
where  μ ̃ t ∈  ℝ ++ denotes the growth rate of the money supply between the end 
of period  t and the beginning of period  t + 1 (implemented via  lump-sum trans-
fers in the second subperiod of  t ). The monetary authority can implement any arbi-
trary process for the growth rate of the  beginning-of-period money supply, i.e., can 
set,  A t+1 m =  μ t  A t m for any positive path  { μ t } t=1 ∞ , despite the random changes in the 
money supply induced by the  open-market operations.41 Finally, to allow for the 
possibility that monetary policy can affect outcomes by influencing the real rate as 
well as expected inflation, we generalize the constant interest rate  r of Section I to a 
stochastic process  { r t } t=1 ∞ .
To summarize, we model monetary policy as a stochastic process  { τ t } t=1 ∞ , 
where  τ t ≡  ( ω t ,  μ t ,  r t ) . This formulation is general enough to encompass situations 
where monetary policy amounts to changing expected inflation (as in monetar-
ist models) as well as settings where monetary policy amounts to directly influ-
encing real rates (as in New Keynesian models). We assume  { τ t } t=1 ∞ follows 
a Markov chain with transition matrix  σ ij = Pr ( τ t+1 =  τ j | τ t =  τ i ) , where 
 τ i ≡  ( ω i ,  μ i ,  r i ) ∈  ℝ ++ 3 and  τ j ≡  ( ω j ,  μ j ,  r j ) ∈  ℝ ++ 3 for  i, j ∈  =  {1, …, M} . 
The realization of  τ t is known at the beginning of period  t .
We specialize the analysis to recursive equilibria in which prices and port-
folio decisions are  time-invariant functions of an aggregate state vector that fol-
lows a  time-invariant law of motion. The state vector is  x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ t ) ∈  ℝ + 5 . 
Asset prices in a recursive equilibrium will be denoted  ϕ t s =  ϕ s ( x t ) ,  ϕ 
–
t s =  ϕ 
– s ( x t ) , 
 ϕ t m =  ϕ m ( x t ) ,  p t s =  p s ( x t ) ,  q t = q ( x t ) , and  ε t s ⁎ =  ε s ⁎ ( x t ) . Let  A t mk denote the 
amount of money that investors have available to trade asset  k ∈  ℕ – at the begin-
ning of period  t (i.e., the bond, if  k = b , or equity, if  k ∈ ℕ ). The laws of 
motion for the state variables  A t m ,  y t , and  τ t are exogenous (as described above), 
while  A t mk =  Ψ k ( x t ) for  k ∈  ℕ 
– , where the decision rule  Ψ k is determined in 
equilibrium. Suppose  x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ i ) and focus on a recursive equilibrium 
with the property that real prices are linear functions of the aggregate dividend, 
and  Ψ k ( x t ) =  λ i k  A t m for all  k ∈  ℕ 
– , where  λ i s ∈  [0, 1] denotes the fraction of the 
41 Specifically,  μ ̃ t =  μ t / [1 +  (1 −  q t )  ω t ] implies  A t+1 m =  μ t  A t m for any  { μ t } t=1 ∞ . The government bud-
get constraint is  B  t +  T t / ϕ t m =  A t+1 m −  ( A t m −  q t  B  t ) , so the real  lump-sum transfer (expressed in terms of the 
 second-subperiod consumption good) needed to implement  A t+1 m =  μ t  A t m is  T t =  [ ( μ t − 1) −  (1 −  q t )  ω t ]  ϕ t m  A t m .
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 beginning-of-period money  holdings that investors have chosen to have avail-
able to trade asset class  k in the OTC round of period  t . Then,  ϕ s ( x t ) =  ϕ i s  y t , 
 ϕ – s ( x t ) ≡  p s ( x t ) ϕ m ( x t ) =  ϕ 
–
i s  y t ,  ϕ m ( x t )  A t m =  Z i  y t ,  q ( x t ) =  q i , and  ε s ⁎ ( x t ) ≡ 
 [ ϕ 
– s ( x t ) −  ϕ s ( x t ) ] / y t =  ϕ 
–
i s −  ϕ i s ≡  ε i 
s ⁎ . 
In online Appendix Section C.C3, we show that an equilibrium is characterized 
by a vector  { ϕ i s,  ε i s ⁎ ,  Z i,  λ i s} i∈,s∈ ℕ –  of  M (3N + 2) unknowns that solves the following 
system with  M (3N + 2) independent equations:
(21)  ϕ i s =  
 γ –δ ____ 
1 +  r i 
  ∑ 
j∈
 σ ij [ ε 
– +  ϕ j s +  α s θ ∫  ε L   ε j 
s ⁎  ( ε j 
s ⁎ − ε) dG (ε) ] ,
(22)  Z  i =  
 γ – _______ 
 (1 +  r i )  μ i 
  ∑ 
j∈
 σ ij [
1 +  α s θ ∫  ε j s⁎  
 ε H 
 
ε −  ε j 
s ⁎ 
 _
 ε j 
s ⁎ +  ϕ j s
  dG (ε) 
]
 Z  j ,
(23)  max ( ω i / λ i b , 1) = 1 +  α s θ ∫  ε i s ⁎  
   ε H 
 ε −  ε i 
s ⁎  _
 ε i 
s ⁎ +  ϕ i s
  dG (ε) for all  (i, s) ∈  × ℕ ,
(24)  Z i λ i s =  
G ( ε i s ⁎ )  A s   _
1 − G ( ε i s ⁎ ) 
 ( ε i s ⁎ +  ϕ i s) for all  (i, s) ∈  × ℕ ,
(25)  1 −  λ i b =  ∑ 
s∈ℕ
λ i s  for all i ∈ . 
In the following subsections, we calibrate and simulate this model to assess the abil-
ity of the theory to account for the empirical findings reported in Section IV. Before 
doing so, it is useful to define the theoretical analogues of the variables we studied 
in the empirical section.
The return of stock  s at date  t + 1 is   t+1 s =  ϕ 
–
t+1 s / ϕ t s − 1 , where 
 ϕ – t s ≡  p t  ϕ t m =  ϕ t s +  ε t ⁎ y t is the cum-dividend price of equity at date  t defined in 
Section II. The real return from holding a dollar between the end of period  t and 
the end of period  t + 1 is  ϕ t+1 m / ϕ t m ≡  (1 +  π t+1 ) −1 , where  π t+1 denotes the (net) 
inflation rate between  t and  t + 1 . In a recursive equilibrium, suppose the state is 
 x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ j ) at  t , and  x t+1 =  ( μ j  A t m ,  y t+1 ,  τ k ) at  t + 1 , then
  1 +   t+1 s =  
 ϕ k s +  ε k s⁎  _ ϕ j s
   y t+1  _ y t  ,
  1 +  π t+1 =  
 Z  j  _ Z  k 
   y t  _  y t+1  μ j . 
So far we have implicitly assumed that  A s , i.e., all outstanding equity shares 
of class  s , are actively traded every day. In actual markets, however, a fraction of 
the outstanding equity shares are seldom traded (stocks held in 401(k) accounts, 
for example). Our theory remains unchanged if we replace  A s with  κ  A s for some 
 κ ∈  [0, 1] that represents the proportion of the universe of outstanding stocks that 
are actively traded, and think of the remaining  (1 − κ)  A s as being held by  nontraders 
outside the model. In an equilibrium in which dealers do not hold assets (as is the 
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case in this section), trade volume for asset class  s at date  t is   t s = 2 α s G ( ε t s ⁎ ) κ  A s . 
A conventional measure of trade volume is the turnover rate used in the empirical 
work of Section IVA. According to the theory, the turnover rate on date  t is
    t s =   t s/ A s = 2 α s G ( ε t s ⁎ ) κ. 
Naturally, a nonzero fraction of inactive stocks (i.e.,  κ < 1 ) lowers the  measured 
level of the turnover rate.42 In a recursive equilibrium, suppose the state at date  t 
is  x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ j ) , then the turnover rate can be written as    j s = 2 α s G ( ε j s ⁎ ) κ . 
In the theory as in our empirical work, whenever we use an average, e.g., of equity 
returns or turnover rates across a set of stocks, we use the arithmetic average, 
e.g.,   t I =  (1/N) ∑ s∈ℕ 
  t s and    t I =  (1/N) ∑ s∈ℕ 
   t s are the average return and the 
average turnover rate for the universe of stocks in the theory.
The (net) nominal rate on the government bond in state  x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ j ) 
is  q  ( x t ) −1 − 1 = max ( ω j / λ j b , 1) − 1 ≡  i  j . Then (22) and (23) imply the Fisher 
equation (the generalization of (14))
(26)  1 =  ∑ 
k∈
 σ jk  
1 +  i  k ____________  
 (1 +  r j ) (1 +  π – jk ) 
,
where  π – jk ≡  μ j  Z  j / ( γ –  Z  k ) − 1 is the average inflation rate between state  x t 
=  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ j ) and state  x t+1 =  ( μ j  A t m ,  y t+1 ,  τ k ) .
B. Calibration
We think of one model period as being one day. We set  θ = 1 in our 
 baseline and abstract from  micro-level pricing frictions induced by  bargaining. 
The dividend growth  rate is independently log-normally distributed over 
time, with mean  0.04 and  standard deviation  0.12 per annum (e.g., as doc-
umented in Lettau and  Ludvigson 2005, Table  1). That is,  y t+1 =  e  x t+1   y t , 
with  x t+1 ∼   ( γ – − 1,  Σ 2 ) , where  γ – − 1 = E (log  y t+1 − log  y t ) = 0.04 / 365 
and  Σ = std (log  y t+1 − log  y t ) = 0.12 / √ 
_
 365. The parameter  δ can be taken as 
a proxy of the riskiness of stocks; a relatively low value ensures the monetary equi-
librium exists even at relatively high inflation rates. We choose  δ =  (0.7) 1/365 , 
i.e., a productive unit has a  70 percent probability of remaining productive each 
year. The number of outstanding shares of stocks of every class is normalized 
to  1 , i.e.,  A s = 1 for all  s ∈ ℕ . We set  N = 20 so the number of asset classes in 
the theory matches the number of synthetic liquidity portfolios considered in the 
 cross-sectional  analysis of Section IVC.
We normalize  α 20 = 1 and calibrate  { α s } s=1 19 so that the  long-run  time-average 
(under the invariant distribution of monetary policy shocks) of the equilibrium 
42 The Turnover column in Table 2 reports the annual turnover rates corresponding to each of the  20 portfolios 
we studied in Section IVC. Notice that the turnover rates appear to be quite low: even the top  5   percent most traded 
stocks are only traded about  3 times per year, on average, which suggests that the model should allow for the 
possibility of  κ < 1 . Clearly, differences in  κ across assets would imply differences in turnover across assets. We 
assume  κ is the same across assets and focus on differences in turnover generated by heterogeneity in  α s because, 
since  κ does not enter the asset pricing equations, differences in  κ are not helpful to understand the facts docu-
mented in Section IV.
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turnover rate of portfolio  s ∈  {1, …, 19} relative to portfolio  20 (i.e.,    – s /   –  20 , 
where    
– s ≡  lim T→∞  (1/T) ∑ t=1 T   t s) matches the ratio of the average turnover rate 
of the  sth and the  twentieth synthetic liquidity portfolio in our sample. Idiosyncratic 
valuation shocks are drawn from a log-normal distribution. The parameters of the 
log-normal and the fraction of actively traded stocks,  κ , are chosen so that under the 
baseline monetary policy process, in response to an unexpected innovation to the 
policy rate, the theory generates: (i) a marketwide stock return (i.e.,   t I) on the day 
of the policy change that matches the corresponding empirical HFIV estimate docu-
mented in Table 1, and (ii) a change in the marketwide turnover rate (i.e.,    t I) on the 
fifth day after the policy change that matches the corresponding empirical estimate 
from the VAR in Section IVD.43
We estimate the stochastic process for the nominal policy 
rate,  { ı ˆt } t=0 ∞ , using data for the rate on the  3-month Eurodollar future contract. 
We formulate that the logarithm of the policy rate follows an AR(1) process, 
we estimate this process at a daily frequency for every trading day between 
January  3, 1994 and December  31, 2007, and approximate it with a  7-state 
Markov chain,  { ı ˆj ,  [ σ ˆ jk ] } j, k=1 7 .44 We then use this estimated policy process to cal-
ibrate the theoretical monetary policy process,  ⟨ ( ω j ,  μ j ,  r j ) ,  [ σ jk ] ⟩ j, k∈ , as follows. 
We set  [ σ jk ] =  [ σ ˆ jk ] , and choose the process of  open-market  operations, 
 { ω j } j∈ , that implements an aggregate real value of money that is constant 
across states, i.e.,  Z  j = Z for all  j ∈  .45 Then (26) implies  ι k ≈  r k +  π k for 
all  k ∈  , where  ι k ≡  ∑ j∈ 
 
 σ kj (1 +  i  j ) is the expected  one-period-ahead nom-
inal rate conditional on the current state  x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ k ) , and  π k ≡  μ k / γ – − 1 is 
the average inflation rate between state  x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ k ) and any state  x t+1 . Let  ı – , 
r – , and  π –, denote the empirical means of the nominal policy rate, the real interest 
rate, and the inflation rate, respectively. Over the sample period  1994–2007, the 
average nominal policy rate was  0.0447 and the average inflation rate was  0.0269 , 
so (14) implies a real rate of  0.0178 per annum.46 Hence,  1 +  ı – =  (1.0447) 1/365 , 
43 This procedure delivers  κ = 0.016 ,  ln  ε t ∼   (− 0.2332, 1.5705) ,  α 1 = 0.1218 ,  α 2 = 0.1707 , 
 α 3 = 0.1972 ,  α 4 = 0.2224 ,  α 5 = 0.2438 ,  α 6 = 0.2590 ,  α 7 = 0.2748 ,  α 8 = 0.2939 ,  α 9 = 0.3121 , 
 α 10 = 0.3306 ,  α 11 = 0.3492 ,  α 12 = 0.3679 ,  α 13 = 0.3899 ,  α 14 = 0.4149 ,  α 15 = 0.4445 ,  α 16 = 0.4821 , 
 α 17 = 0.5284 ,  α 18 = 0.6011 ,  α 19 = 0.7151 .
44 Specifically, the process we estimate is  ln  i  t =  (1 − ξ) ln  i  0 + ξ ln  i  t−1 +  ϵ t , where  ϵ t is Gaussian 
white noise. With  i  t denominated in bps, the estimates are  ξ = 0.9996695 ,  E (ln  i  t ) = ln  i  0 = 5.990701 , 
and  √ 
_
 E ( ϵ t 2 ) = 0.0114289 . Hence, the estimated mean and standard deviation of the nominal rate,  i t , are  E ( i  t ) = 441 
and  √ 
_
 var ( i  t ) =  √ 
___________
  E ( ϵ t 2 ) / (1 −  ξ 2 ) = 206.2516 . The estimated AR(1) process is very persistent so, as suggested 
by Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010), we use the Rouwenhorst method to compute the approximating Markov 
matrix and states. The code for the Rouwenhorst method is also from Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010).
45 The precise process of  open-market operations is described in online Appendix Section C (Proposition 12). 
This policy implies the real price of money does not change at the times when monetary  policy switches 
states. Consider a state  x t =  ( A t m ,  y t ,  τ i ) . The relevant nominal prices in the model are the dollar price of 
the  second-subperiod consumption good,  1 / ϕ m ( x t ) =  A t m / ( Z  i  y t ) , and the dollar price of an equity share, 
 p s ( x t ) =  A t m ( ε i s ⁎ +  ϕ i s)  y t / ( Z  i  y t ) . Under the policy  { ω j } j∈ that implements  Z  j = Z for all  j ∈  ,  ϕ m ( x t ) is 
 invariant to monetary policy surprises on impact, and  p s ( x t ) responds only if the policy surprise has an effect on 
the real  cum-divided equity price. Thus, this process of  open-market operations makes our  flexible-price model 
consistent with the fact that nominal prices in the data typically do not jump when there is a surprise change in the 
nominal policy rate, even when the policy shock may imply a change in the path of expected inflation.
46 As in Section  IVA for the policy rate we use the  3-month Eurodollar futures rate (series IEDCS00 
produced by the CME Group available via Datastream). The annual average inflation rate is imputed 
as  [CPI  (January _ 2008) / CPI  (January _ 1994) ] 1/14 − 1 , where  CPI  (Month _ Year) is monthly CPI index available 
from FRED at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL.
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 1 +  r – =  (1.0178) 1/365 , and  1 +  π – =  (1.0269) 1/365 . For each  k ∈  , we set 
 r k =  r – + w η ˆk and  π k ≡  π – +  (1 − w)  η ˆk , where  η ˆk ≡  ı ˆk −  ı – , and  w ∈  [0, 1] 
indexes the degree of pass-through from nominal rates to real rates. We use  w = 0.8 
as baseline, which implies a  100 bp increase in the nominal rate is associated with 
a  80 bp increase in the real rate and a  20 bp increase in expected inflation.47
C. Simulation
In this section we conduct two experiments to assess the ability of the theory to 
match the evidence documented in Section IV. In both experiments, we simulate the 
calibrated model as follows. First, compute the equilibrium functions characterized 
by (21)–(25). Second, simulate 1,000 samples of the dividend, each of length equal 
to our data sample. Then set the path of the nominal rate in the model equal to the 
actual empirical path of the policy rate used in our empirical work. Finally, compute 
the equilibrium path of the model 1,000 times (one for each realization of the simu-
lated dividend path), and for each simulated equilibrium path, compute the average 
daily equity return for each asset class.
Experiment 1: Disaggregative  Announcement-Day Effects.—The first experi-
ment is the model analogue of the  cross-sectional analysis of Section IVB. For each 
of the  20 asset classes, we run an  event-study regression for  announcement-day 
returns 1,000 times (one for each of the 1,000 simulated equilibrium paths for daily 
stock return for that particular asset class). The results are illustrated in Figure 6, 
which reports the empirical HFIV estimates from Table 2 along with the regres-
sion estimates from the simulated model.48 For each theoretical portfolio, the 
value displayed in Figure 6 is the average  E-based estimate over the model 1,000 
simulations. The  99  percent confidence intervals for the theoretical estimates are 
constructed using the distribution of estimates from the 1,000 model simulations. 
The  99   percent confidence intervals for the empirical estimates are from the HFIV 
regressions from Section  IVC. The model was calibrated so that the marketwide 
response to the policy shock on the announcement day matches the empirical HFIV 
estimate of Table 1. We are interested in whether the theory can account for the 
profile of returns across stocks with different turnover liquidity, the hallmark of 
the  turnover-liquidity transmission mechanism. Figure 6 shows the theory is able 
to generate most of the  announcement-day tilting in  cross-sectional returns. The fit 
is excellent for the first 14 liquidity portfolios. For the 6 most liquid portfolios, the 
model predicts a bit less tilting than the data.
Experiment 2: Impulse Responses.—The second experiment is the model ana-
logue of the VAR analysis of Section IVD. Figure 7 reports the  model-generated 
47 This choice is guided by the pass-through estimates in Gertler and Karadi (2015) at a  two-year horizon. As 
a robustness check, we have also set  w = 1 and recalibrated the model to fit the same data targets as the baseline 
calibration, and found that the quantitative performance of the theory is very similar to the case with  w = 0.8 . In 
online Appendix Section D.D6 we report results for the case with  w = 0 .
48 Since the monetary policy is exogenous in the model, the  E-based estimates based on the synthetic data are 
not subject to the biases discussed in Section IVB. For this reason, here we use the HFIV empirical estimates as a 
benchmark for comparison.
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impulse responses for the policy rate, the cumulative marketwide stock return, and 
the average turnover rate to a  1 bp increase in the policy rate, along with the corre-
sponding empirical impulse responses and  99  percent confidence intervals estimated 
from actual data (those described in Section IVD). The top and bottom panels show 
responses for forecast horizons of 30 days and 120 days, respectively. The path of 
the policy rate from the model is quite close to the empirical path. The middle pan-
els show the response of the daily cumulative stock return. On impact, in response 
to the  1 bp unexpected increase in the nominal rate, the model stock return falls 
by  9.38  bps: the same as the HFIV estimate of Table 1, as targeted by the calibration. 
Since persistence (of the policy shock and turnover liquidity) is an essential element 
of the theoretical mechanism, we are interested in whether the model can account for 
the dynamics of the response of the cumulative return. The theoretical and empirical 
impulse responses for subsequent days after the  policy shock remain quite close. 
For example, the theoretical impulse response can account for over  80   percent of the 
empirical response for the first  30 days, and for at least  66   percent of the empirical 
response for the subsequent  90 days.49
The right panels of Figure 7 show the response of the level of the daily turnover 
rate. The model was calibrated so that the response of turnover on day  5 after the 
announcement matches the empirical estimate. On impact, in response to a  1  bp 
unexpected increase in the nominal rate, the turnover rate falls by  − 6.8502 ×  10 −6 
in the model. The model response for turnover is about seven times smaller than the 
49 The simulated theoretical cumulative return is − 8.7 bp on day 30, and − 7.7 bp on day 120. The estimated 




































Figure 6. Cross-Sectional Announcement-Day Responses of Stock Returns to Policy Rate
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empirical estimate ( − 4.8692 ×  10 −5 according to the empirical impulse response). 
However, although the model response for turnover is much smaller on impact, it 
is very persistent and remains relatively close to the empirical response at longer 
 horizons. For example, the difference between the empirical path for the turnover 
rate and the theoretical path becomes statistically insignificant for all days after 
day 3. Both the empirical and the theoretical responses are quite persistent. This 
persistent effect of policy on the turnover rate is consistent with a response in return 
that is quantitatively in line with the data, even though the  announcement-day effect 
on turnover is much smaller than in the data.
VI. Conclusion
We conclude by mentioning what we think are three promising avenues for 
future work. First, in the model we have presented, all asset purchases are paid for 
with outside money. In other words, the theory focuses on the relevant margin for 
 settings, transactions, or traders for which credit limits have become binding. While 
arguably stark, we think this formulation is a useful benchmark to contrast with the 
traditional  asset-pricing literature that abstracts from the role of costly or scarce 
payment instruments. Having said this, we think it would be useful to extend the the-
ory to allow for credit arrangements. The possibility of buying on margin, for exam-
ple, is likely to interact with the monetary mechanisms we have emphasized here in 
interesting ways (see Lagos and Zhang 2018 for work along these lines). Second, 
given that trading frictions in the exchange process are at the center of the analysis 
(e.g., the likelihood of finding a counterparty, or the market power of  dealers who 
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Figure 7. Empirical and Theoretical Impulse Responses to a 1 Basis Point Increase in the Policy Rate
Notes: The darker solid line is the estimated empirical impulse response. Broken lines are the 95 percent confidence 
bands of the empirical impulse response.
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intermediate transactions), it would be interesting to  endogenize them (see Lagos 
and Zhang 2015 for work in this direction). Third, while we have focused on stocks 
in our empirical work, the transmission mechanism we have  identified is likely to be 
 operative, and possibly even more  conspicuous, in markets for other assets, such as 
Treasury securities and assets that trade in more frictional  over-the-counter markets.
REFERENCES
Ang, Andrew, Assaf A. Shtauber, and Paul C. Tetlock. 2013. “Asset Pricing in the Dark: The Cross-Sec-
tion of OTC Stocks.” Review of Financial Studies 26 (12): 2985–3028.
Bernanke, Ben S., and Kenneth N. Kuttner. 2005. “What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction to Fed-
eral Reserve Policy?” Journal of Finance 60 (3): 1221–57.
Cochrane, John H., and Monika Piazzesi. 2002. “The Fed and Interest Rates: A High-Frequency Iden-
tification.” American Economic Review 92 (2): 90–95.
Cook, Timothy, and Thomas Hahn. 1989. “The Effect of Changes in the Federal Funds Rate Target on 
Market Interest Rates in the 1970s.” Journal of Monetary Economics 24 (3): 331–51.
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Gârleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. 2005. “Over-the-Counter Mar-
kets.” Econometrica 73 (6): 1815–47.
Duffie, Darrell, Nicolae Gârleanu, and Lasse Heje Pedersen. 2007. “Valuation in Over-the-Counter 
Markets.” Review of Financial Studies 20 (6): 1865–1900.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French. 1988. “Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock 
Prices.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (2): 246–73.
Galindev, Ragchaasuren, and Damba Lkhagvasuren. 2010. “Discretization of Highly Persistent Cor-
related AR(1) Shocks.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (7): 1260–76.
Gârleanu, Nicolae. 2009. “Portfolio Choice and Pricing in Illiquid Markets.” Journal of Economic The-
ory 144 (2): 532–64.
Gertler, Mark, and Peter Karadi. 2015. “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic 
Activity.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 7 (1): 44–76.
Gonçalves, Sílvia, and Lutz Kilian. 2004. “Bootstrapping Autoregressions with Conditional Heteroske-
dasticity of Unknown Form.” Journal of Econometrics 123 (1): 89–120.
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy, and Michael Weber. 2016. “Are Sticky Prices Costly? Evidence from the Stock 
Market.” American Economic Review 106 (1): 165–99.
Gürkaynak, Refet S., Brian P. Sack, and Eric T. Swanson. 2007. “Market-Based Measures of Monetary 
Policy Expectations.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 25 (2): 201–12.
Hamilton, James D. 2003. “What Is an Oil Shock?” Journal of Econometrics 113 (2): 363–98.
Harrison, J. Michael, and David M. Kreps. 1978. “Speculative Investor Behavior in a Stock Market 
with Heterogeneous Expectations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 92 (2): 323–36.
Kilian, Lutz. 2008a. “The Economic Effects of Energy Price Shocks.” Journal of Economic Literature 
46 (4): 871–909.
Kilian, Lutz. 2008b. “Exogenous Oil Supply Shocks: How Big Are They and How Much Do They 
Matter for the US Economy?” Review of Economics and Statistics 90 (2): 216–40.
Kuttner, Kenneth N. 2001. “Monetary Policy Surprises and Interest Rates: Evidence from the Fed 
Funds Futures Market.” Journal of Monetary Economics 47 (3): 523–44.
Lagos, Ricardo, and Guillaume Rocheteau. 2009. “Liquidity in Asset Markets with Search Fric-
tions.” Econometrica 77 (2): 403–26.
Lagos, Ricardo, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill. 2011. “Crises and Liquidity in Over-
the-Counter Markets.” Journal of Economic Theory 146 (6): 2169–2205.
Lagos, Ricardo, and Shengxing Zhang. 2015. “Monetary Exchange in Over-the-Counter Markets: A 
Theory of Speculative Bubbles, the Fed Model, and Self-Fulfilling Liquidity Crises.” NBER Work-
ing Paper 21528.
Lagos, Ricardo, and Shengxing Zhang. 2018. “On Money as a Medium of Exchange in Near-Cashless 
Credit Economies.” Unpublished.
Lettau, Martin, and Sydney C. Ludvigson. 2005. “Expected Returns and Expected Dividend 
Growth.” Journal of Financial Economics 76 (3): 583–626.
Mertens, Karel, and Morten O. Ravn. 2013. “The Dynamic Effects of Personal and Corporate Income 
Tax Changes in the United States.” American Economic Review 103 (4): 1212–47.
Rigobon, Roberto, and Brian Sack. 2004. “The Impact of Monetary Policy on Asset Prices.” Journal 
of Monetary Economics 51 (8): 1553–75.
1672 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW JUNE 2020
Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 1989. “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the 
Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz.” In NBER Macroeconomics Annual: 1989, Vol. 4, edited by Oliv-
ier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, 121–84. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2012. “Disentangling the Channels of the 2007–2009 Reces-
sion.” NBER Working Paper 18094.
Thorbecke, Willem. 1997. “On Stock Market Returns and Monetary Policy.” Journal of Finance 52 
(2): 635–54.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Pierre-Olivier Weill. 2008. “A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-Run Phe-
nomenon.” Journal of Finance 63 (3): 1361–98.
Weill, Pierre-Olivier. 2007. “Leaning against the Wind.” Review of Economic Studies 74 (4): 1329–54.
